The problem of temporal awareness manifests itself in many ways: in our experience of the passage of time, in our experience of the movement of objects across space, in our experience of temporally separated objects as belonging together (as in the case of the notes in a melody), and so on. Each of these cases makes it clear that our experience, in some sense, extends beyond what's happening now. But what model of experience accounts for this phenomenon? This chapter argues that two classical models — the specious present theory and the retention theory — are both unsatisfactory. It concludes by suggesting some of the richer phenomenological features that ought to play a central role in any more satisfactory account.
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