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The Existence of God$
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Richard Swinburne

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780199271672

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199271672.001.0001

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Arguments from Consciousness and Morality

Arguments from Consciousness and Morality

Chapter:
(p.192) 9 Arguments from Consciousness and Morality
Source:
The Existence of God
Author(s):

Richard Swinburne (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199271672.003.0010

Humans are conscious beings; they have mental events — sensations, thoughts, and intentions, which consist in properties possessed by souls. Science might one day produce a list of correlations between mental events and brain events; but it is immensely improbable that science would ever be able to explain why there are souls and why particular brain events are correlated with particular mental events. Theism can explain this in terms of God having good reasons to bring about certain kinds of mental life. Moral truths being in essence necessary truths provide no grounds for a good argument to God; but human awareness of moral truths does provide an argument to God of moderate strength.

Keywords:   moral argument, soul, science, mental events, brain events

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