The book provides a new approach to Corporate Governance (CG) between and beyond, on one side, the agency and property right theory views, criticized for being too narrow; and, on the other side, the stakeholder view, criticized for being overly descriptive and analytically unmanageable. Bringing together distinguished scholars from economics, organization theory, cognitive science, and economic sociology, the book addresses the agenda of developing a pluralistic yet precise and design oriented approach to CG. Core basic traits of the proposed approach, linking the various contributions togeth ... More

The book provides a new approach to Corporate Governance (CG) between and beyond, on one side, the agency and property right theory views, criticized for being too narrow; and, on the other side, the stakeholder view, criticized for being overly descriptive and analytically unmanageable. Bringing together distinguished scholars from economics, organization theory, cognitive science, and economic sociology, the book addresses the agenda of developing a pluralistic yet precise and design oriented approach to CG. Core basic traits of the proposed approach, linking the various contributions together, include: a revision of some rather questionable assumptions (such as that ‘objective alignment’ is a good thing, that firms do not have a personality distinct from that of shareholders, and that agents are only moved by extrinsic motivation); a recommended exit from the shareholder/stakeholder and the convergence/divergence dilemmas — which stem from rather universalistic and ‘one-best-way’ views of CG on both sides; and the development of a contingency approach to the design of effective CG structures. The book provides for policy makers different indications of what ‘good practices’ of CG are, with respect to the dominant view, in at least two respects: the portfolio of such practices is extended beyond the conventional set of incentives and controls; and good governance configurations are made contingent to variables ranging from more proximate factors such as actors' preferences and task complexity, to less proximate factors such as the economic cycle, the relative scarcity of different types of capital, labour market structures, and industrial relations.