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Minds, Ethics, and ConditionalsThemes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson$
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Ian Ravenscroft

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199267989

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267989.001.0001

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Jackson's Change of Mind: Representationalism, a Priorism and the Knowledge Argument

Jackson's Change of Mind: Representationalism, a Priorism and the Knowledge Argument

Chapter:
(p.189) 8 Jackson's Change of Mind: Representationalism, a Priorism and the Knowledge Argument
Source:
Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals
Author(s):

Robert Van Gulick (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267989.003.0009

Few arguments in the recent philosophy of mind have generated as much discussion or controversy as Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument (KA), and none has had a more surprising history. Having offered the KA in 1983 and ably defended it for fifteen years against a wide variety of objections, Jackson did an about-face in 1998 and disavowed it. His rejection of the argument is essentially coupled with the acceptance of another controversial if widely held view, namely the Representational Theory of Consciousness or at least of Conscious Sensory Experience (RTS), which he regards as the sole means to defeat the KA and avoid the cognitive illusion that generates its intuitive appeal. This chapter begins by briefly reviewing objections to the KA. It considers where, if anywhere, Jackson's own present critical view fits in the logical geography of options. It then turns to the question of whether the RTS is in fact either necessary or sufficient for refuting the KA.

Keywords:   Frank Jackson, Knowledge Argument, Conscious Sensory Experience

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