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Minds, Ethics, and ConditionalsThemes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson$
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Ian Ravenscroft

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199267989

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267989.001.0001

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Conditionals: A Debate with Jackson

Conditionals: A Debate with Jackson

Chapter:
(p.311) 13 Conditionals: A Debate with Jackson
Source:
Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals
Author(s):

Graham Priest (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267989.003.0014

This chapter presents a number of concerns about Jackson's approach to conditionals. The first section discusses the view defended by Frank Jackson in his book Conditionals; it describes his account and notes some of its shortcomings. There are good reasons for doing this. Views of the kind defended there are, if not orthodox, still very common. And Jackson defends the view in, arguably, its most cogent form. The second section sketches a rather different account, which avoids these shortcomings. It proposes a general framework for an account of conditionals, one that leaves plenty of parameters to be adjusted for fine tuning.

Keywords:   Frank Jackson, conditionals, semantics

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