Identity, Essence, and Indiscernibility
What Kripke calls the ‘dark doctrine of a relation of contingent identity’ appears to violate Leibniz's Law. If x and y are identical, they share all their properties; since x has the property of necessary identity with x, y must have this property as well. But this is a paradoxical result. The statue and its clay clearly stand in some intimate identity-like relation. If the relation is not contingent identity, what is it? This chapter attempts an answer. So-called contingent identicals are ‘coincident’; they may have different transworld careers, but in this world they are just alike.
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.