This book expands the argument introduced in the Clarendon Lectures in Law presented at Oxford University in the fall of 1998. It introduces and attempts to sustain two different kinds of arguments; the aim is not only to defend a range of views of substantive issues in legal theory, but also to vindicate by example a certain methodological approach to such issues — an approach whose fundamental commitments are those of philosophical pragmatism. The book advances three main theses. Part I defends the view that the core of tort law is best understood as embodying the principle of corrective jus ... More

This book expands the argument introduced in the Clarendon Lectures in Law presented at Oxford University in the fall of 1998. It introduces and attempts to sustain two different kinds of arguments; the aim is not only to defend a range of views of substantive issues in legal theory, but also to vindicate by example a certain methodological approach to such issues — an approach whose fundamental commitments are those of philosophical pragmatism. The book advances three main theses. Part I defends the view that the core of tort law is best understood as embodying the principle of corrective justice. Part II defends a version of inclusive legal positivism. Part III defends what has been called ‘descriptive jurisprudence’.