Dispositions as Causes
This chapter discusses dispositions as causes. It holds that dispositions are properties, and that properties play causal roles in a thing's interactions with the world about them. It puts forward a causal efficacy of dispositions. The second section shows why it is undesirable to argue that dispositions are causally impotent. The third to sixth sections tackle a number of objections to the causally efficacious view of dispositions — that dispositions are of the wrong ontological category, redundant scientific explanations and trivial explanations, and the virtus dormitiva objection. The seventh section presents the ‘uncombable hair syndrome’. The eighth section presents cases where triviality must be conceded. The ninth section looks at dispositions causes par excellence.
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