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Causation and ResponsibilityAn Essay in Law, Morals, and Metaphysics$
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Michael S. Moore

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199256860

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256860.001.0001

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The Prima Facie Demands of the Law on the Concept of Causation

The Prima Facie Demands of the Law on the Concept of Causation

Chapter:
(p.109) 5 The Prima Facie Demands of the Law on the Concept of Causation
Source:
Causation and Responsibility
Author(s):

Michael S. Moore (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256860.003.0005

This chapter takes the law pretty much at face value in describing the presuppositions about causation made by that law. It examines the cause/correlation distinction, the cause/condition distinction, overdetermining and pre-emptive causes; the scalarity, transitivity, and temporal asymmetry of causation; intervening causes breaking causal chains, omissions as causes, preventions as effects, the extensionality of causal contexts of speech; and the aphrodisiac effect of culpability on causation.

Keywords:   correlation, cause, condition, scalarity, transitivity, temporal asymmetry, extensionality, omissions, preventions, intervening causes

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