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Causation and ResponsibilityAn Essay in Law, Morals, and Metaphysics$
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Michael S. Moore

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199256860

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256860.001.0001

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The Counterfactual Theory of Causation

The Counterfactual Theory of Causation

Chapter:
(p.391) 17 The Counterfactual Theory of Causation
Source:
Causation and Responsibility
Author(s):

Michael S. Moore (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256860.003.0017

This chapter examines the counterfactual theory of causation, applying the possible world conception of counterfactuals. A wide variety of reasons is given in support for the conclusion that not only is causation not to be identified with counterfactual dependency, but that such dependency is also not either a necessary or a sufficient condition for causation. Such dependency is thus unreliable even as a test for when causation is present or absent, to say nothing of being an implausible theory about the nature of causation.

Keywords:   counterfactual dependency, nature of causation, counterfactuals

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