- Title Pages
- 1 Emotion As Cognitive and Its Therapy
- 2 The Emotions As Value Judgements In Chrysippus
- 3 Seneca's Defence
- 4 Seneca's Defence
- 5 The Arts
- 6 Posidonius On the Irrational Forces In Emotion
- 7 Posidonius
- 8 Posidonius
- 9 Aspasius and Other Objections To Chrysippus
- 10 What Is Missing From the Judgemental Analysis?
- 11 The Role Of Analytic Philosophy In Stoic Cognitive Therapy
- 12 Stoic Indifference: A Barrier To Therapy?
- 13 The Case For and Against Eradication Of Emotion
- 14 The Traditions Of Moderation and Eradication
- 15 How the Ancient Exercises Work
- 16 Exercises Concerned With Time and the Self
- 17 Physiology and the Non‐Cognitive Galen's Alternative Approach to Emotion
- 18 Sex, Love, and Marriage In Pagan Philosophy and the Use Of Catharsis
- 19 Catharsis and the Classification Of Therapies
- 20 Emotional Conflict and the Divided Self
- 21 The Concept Of Will
- 22 First Movements As Bad Thoughts
- 23 From First Movements To the Seven Cardinal Sins Evagrius
- 24 First Movements In Augustine
- 25 Christians On Moderation Versus Eradication
- 26 Augustine On Lust and the Will
- Bibliography Of Secondary Sources Mentioned
- Index Of Ancient Thinkers
- Index Locorum
- Subject and Name Index
The Concept Of Will
The Concept Of Will
- (p.319) 21 The Concept Of Will
- Emotion and Peace of Mind
Richard Sorabji (Contributor Webpage)
- Oxford University Press
The term ‘free will’ appears first in Lucretius' Latin, but will plays little role in accounts of freedom until Augustine, and that innovation was not clarifying. The concept of will was composed by Augustine out of elements that had flourished better in pagan philosophy when separate. ‘Will’ translates Greek boulêsis or thelêsis. Freedom and responsibility are treated together in Plato's Republic, but will power is treated separately, and none are discussed under the name boulêsis by him or until Posidonius. In Aristotle, boulêsis is a rational desire for end not means, and for good not pleasure or honour, but it is not closely connected with freedom, responsibility or will power. A connexion between will (voluntas) and responsibility (voluntarius) emerges in Seneca's Latin, but his will is not distinct from reason. Alexander (Aristotelian) follows Epictetus (Stoic), who first tied responsibility closely to Aristotle's prohairesis, rational desire for means.
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