Irreducibility and Causal Efficacy
This chapter argues for two corollaries of this metaphysical conception. First, normative facts, properties, and relations are irreducible and sui generis: they cannot be reduced to natural facts, properties, or relations. (The argument for this corollary relies on an argument that George Bealer has given against functionalism in the philosophy of mind.) Secondly, contrary to what many philosophers hold, they are causally efficacious, and enter into causal explanations of contingent facts about what happens in the world. This view of normative facts as causally efficacious can be defended against objections in much the same way as philosophers of mind have defended mental causation (i.e., the view that mental states are causally efficacious); it is compatible with the modest sort of naturalism that claims that all causal facts are realized in (but not necessarily identical to) natural facts.
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.