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The Nature of Normativity$
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Ralph Wedgwood

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199251315

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251315.001.0001

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Causal Theories and Conceptual Analyses

Causal Theories and Conceptual Analyses

(p.58) 3 Causal Theories and Conceptual Analyses
The Nature of Normativity

Ralph Wedgwood (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter considers two other rival accounts of normative statements. First, it considers the account of ‘Cornell moral realism’ which is based on applying the causal theory of reference to normative terms. Secondly, it considers the accounts of David Lewis, Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit, and Michael Smith, which are based on the attempt to give a ‘conceptual analysis’ of normative statements. It is argued that both of these approaches fail, largely because they cannot accommodate the sort of ‘internalism’ that was argued for in Chapter 1.

Keywords:   Cornell moral realism, causal theory of reference, David Lewis, Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit, Michael Smith, internalism

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