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The Nature of Normativity$
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Ralph Wedgwood

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199251315

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251315.001.0001

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(p.1) Introduction
The Nature of Normativity

Ralph Wedgwood (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter first introduces one of the main ideas of the book — that the normativity of the intentional is the ‘key to metaethics’. It is suggested that this idea naturally captures a kind of Platonism about the normative. It then compares the theory that is outlined in the rest of the book with the best-known alternative theories (such as expressivist and constructivist theories, the theories built around a ‘conceptual analysis’ of normative concepts, the naturalist theory that is known as ‘Cornell moral realism’, and quietist forms of realism). Finally, it gives a summary of the contents of later chapters, and makes some comments on the philosophical method that is used in the rest of the book.

Keywords:   metaethics, normativity, intentional, Platonism, expressivism, constructivism, conceptual analysis, naturalism, Cornell moral realism, quietism

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