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Thought, Reference, and ExperienceThemes from the Philosophy of Gareth Evans$
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José Luis Bermúdez

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199248964

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199248964.001.0001

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“Another I”: Representing Conscious States, Perception, and Others *

“Another I”: Representing Conscious States, Perception, and Others *

Chapter:
(p.220) 7 “Another I”: Representing Conscious States, Perception, and Others*
Source:
Thought, Reference, and Experience
Author(s):

Christopher Peacocke (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199248964.003.0008

This chapter explores how we think about conscious perceptual experience, both our own and that of others. It begins by considering the first-person case, that in which a thinker judges that he himself sees. The case falls within a general area to which Gareth Evans made original, important, and influential contributions, notably on the self-ascription of belief. After considering the first-person case and some of the epistemic and metaphysical ramifications of the treatment offered, the chapter goes on to compare it with Evans's account. It then discusses the relation between first-person and third-person ascription and to the explanation of some developmental phenomena. It concludes with a discussion of the extension of the model presented to the self-ascription and other-ascription of action and intentionality.

Keywords:   Gareth Evans, conscious perceptual experience, first person, third person, self ascription

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