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Sexual Solipsism$
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Rae Langton

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199247066

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247066.001.0001

Introduction

Chapter:
(p. 1 ) Introduction
Source:
Sexual Solipsism
Author(s):

Rae Langton (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247066.003.0001

Solipsism involves going on as if you are the only person. Traditionally viewed as a morally neutral problem in epistemology (Descartes), it can also emerge as the morally loaded problem of objectification, or treating other people as things (Kant, Nussbaum, de Beauvoir, MacKinnon). Objectification is usually viewed as a moral concept: treating someone as an instrument, denying their autonomy. But there is an epistemological concept of objectification which involves projection. Are these unrelated? No. The chapters in this book develop an understanding of objectification which connects moral and epistemological dimensions, with respect to pornography, and further afield.

Keywords:   objectification, pornography, solipsism, autonomy, epistemology, projection, Descartes, Kant, Nussbaum, de Beauvoir

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