Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Worlds of PossibilityModal Realism and the Semantics of Modal Logic$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Charles S. Chihara

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780199246557

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199246557.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 13 December 2018

Modality without Worlds I

Modality without Worlds I

The Semantics of Modal Sentential Logic

(p.197) 6 Modality without Worlds I
The Worlds of Possibility

Charles S. Chihara

Oxford University Press

It is worth reviewing, at this point, the argument for Modal Realism that was given in the Introduction. There, it was argued that philosophers who eschew including possible worlds in their ontology are thus precluded from making use of possible worlds semantics in their assessments of the validity and invalidity of modal arguments, and in their explanations and analyses of modal reasoning. As seen in previous chapters, for many Modal Realists, this is too high a price to pay for ontological economy. In response to this argument, this chapter puts forward an account of modal logic that can be used both in the assessments of the validity and invalidity of modal arguments and also in the explanations and analyses of modal reasoning.

Keywords:   Modal Realism, possible worlds, semantics, modal arguments, modal reasoning, sentential calculus, C-sequences

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .