Given the many problems and implausibilities that infect Modal Realism, some form of anti-realism may appear at this point to be irresistible. In his book, Graeme Forbes adopts an anti-realist view of modality, which can be classified as a form of instrumentalism. His main reasons for rejecting modal realism are epistemological. On the other hand, Gideon Rosen's modal fictionalism — another version of anti-realism — seems to be motivated more by ontological concerns. This chapter examines these two versions of anti-Modal Realism with the objective of developing an alternative anti-realistic view. It is overall widely believed that possible worlds semantics provides us with an accurate analysis of modal statements.
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