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Joint Attention: Communication and Other MindsIssues in Philosophy and Psychology$
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Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack, and Johannes Roessler

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199245635

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199245635.001.0001

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Joint Attention and the Notion of Subject: Insights from Apes, Normal Children, and Children with Autis m

Joint Attention and the Notion of Subject: Insights from Apes, Normal Children, and Children with Autis m

Chapter:
(p.65) 4 Joint Attention and the Notion of Subject: Insights from Apes, Normal Children, and Children with Autism
Source:
Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds
Author(s):

Juan-Carlos Gómez

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199245635.003.0004

This chapter proposes that the cognitive mechanisms of joint attention (defined as a combination of attention following skills with attention contact skills) are not metarepresentational in nature, but based upon the coordination of two different types of intentional understanding — third-person and second-person intentions — that are represented at the level of a sensorimotor notion of others as subjects. This proposal is developed and analyzed from a comparative perspective through a review of findings concerning apes, typically developing children, and children with autism. It is argued that each of these populations illustrates a different type of joint attention system based upon different notions of the other as a subject.

Keywords:   non-human primates, autism, intentionality, subject, theory of mind, meta-representation

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