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Joint Attention: Communication and Other MindsIssues in Philosophy and Psychology$
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Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack, and Johannes Roessler

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199245635

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199245635.001.0001

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Joint Attention: Its Nature, Reflexivity, and Relation to Common Knowledg e

Joint Attention: Its Nature, Reflexivity, and Relation to Common Knowledg e

Chapter:
(p.298) 14 Joint Attention: Its Nature, Reflexivity, and Relation to Common Knowledge
Source:
Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds
Author(s):

Christopher Peacocke (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199245635.003.0014

The openness of joint awareness between two or more subjects is a perceptual phenomenon. It involves a certain mutual awareness between the subjects, an awareness that makes reference to that very awareness itself. Properly characterized, such awareness can generate iterated awareness ‘x is aware that y is aware that x is aware...’ to whatever level the subjects can sustain. The openness should not be characterized in terms of Lewis–Schiffer common knowledge, the conditions for which are not met in many basic cases of joint attention. A range of phenomena, including linguistic communication and other interpersonal relations, that have previously been described in terms of common knowledge should rather be seen as involving open joint awareness. An Appendix to this chapter discusses the relations of this approach to Barwise's discussions, and disputes the claim that these mental phenomena require the postulation of self-involving situations.

Keywords:   common knowledge, joint attention, perception, schiffer, barwise, lewis, self-reference, self-involving situations

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