Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Law and Philosophy$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Michael Freeman and Ross Harrison

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199237159

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199237159.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 23 April 2019

Monism, Interpretivism, and Law's Aim

Monism, Interpretivism, and Law's Aim

Chapter:
(p.49) 3 Monism, Interpretivism, and Law's Aim
Source:
Law and Philosophy
Author(s):

George Letsas

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199237159.003.0003

This chapter argues that the differences between Dworkinian interpretivism on one hand, and positivism and natural law on the other can be located not on the question of law's connection to moral justification, but rather on different types of moral justification in general. It focuses on what Liam Murphy has called monist and dualist theories of practical principle. It shows that what Gardner takes to be an inconsistency within Dworkin's interpretivism can be explained away under non-monist theories of practical principle. It identifies a non-monist interpretivist position that stands on its own as a separate view even if it cannot be attributed to Dworkin.

Keywords:   Dworkin, positivism, natural law, Gardner, moral justification, Liam Murphy

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .