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Vagueness and Degrees of Truth$
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Nicholas J. J. Smith

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199233007

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199233007.001.0001

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Worldly Vagueness and Semantic Indeterminacy

Chapter:
(p.277) 6 Worldly Vagueness and Semantic Indeterminacy
Source:
Vagueness and Degrees of Truth
Author(s):

Nicholas J. J. Smith (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199233007.003.0007

This chapter continues the examination begun in the previous chapter of objections to the fuzzy view of vagueness in particular, and to degree theoretic treatments of vagueness in general. It covers the major remaining objections to the fuzzy view: the problems of artificial precision and sharp boundaries. In response, a new version of the fuzzy view is proposed, called fuzzy plurivaluationism, which combines fuzzy models with semantic indeterminacy of the sort involved in plurivaluationism. The chapter concludes that fuzzy plurivaluationism is the correct theory of vagueness, on the grounds that, first, it is a degree theory — and so satisfies the positive requirement on a theory of vagueness — and, second, it withstands all known objections to degree theories.

Keywords:   vagueness, fuzzy plurivaluationism, artificial precision, sharp boundaries

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