Laws at Cross-Purposes: Conceptual Confusion and Political Divergence 1
The hypothesis of the research project reported in this volume is that basic concepts of EU law are conceptually divergent in spite of their lexical similarity, due to the fact that they are rooted in, and revert back into, domestic legal frameworks that have cogent ways of their own of rewriting facts in terms of legal consequences. This chapter argues that this hypothesis must be refined. Conceptual divergence is the epiphenomenon of two more basic forces: conceptual confusion and political divergence. There is a lack of conceptual clarity pervading community as well as domestic law in our times, both of which appear to be driven by and followed by divergent political pursuits from various legal agents, not all of them Member States.
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