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The Philosophy of Information$
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Luciano Floridi

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199232383

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232383.001.0001

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Consciousness, agents, and the knowledge game

Consciousness, agents, and the knowledge game

(p.290) 13 Consciousness, agents, and the knowledge game
The Philosophy of Information

Luciano Floridi (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

The chapter applies the informational analysis of knowledge in order to pursue three goals. The first is to introduce the ‘knowledge game’, a new, simple and yet powerful tool for analysing some intriguing philosophical questions. The second is to apply the knowledge game as an informative test to discriminate between conscious (human) and conscious-less agents (zombies and robots), depending on which version of the game they can win. And the third is to use a version of the knowledge game to provide an answer to Dretske's question ‘how do you know you are not a zombie?’. At the end of the chapter one should have a better view of which agents count as conscious informational organisms (inforgs), that is, the sort of inforgs that can intentionally process relevant semantic information.

Keywords:   artificial agents, consciousness, inferentialism, informational organisms, knowledge game, muddy children theorem, the three wise men theorem, zombies

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