A Disjunctive Conception of Acting for Reasons
This chapter introduces a disjunctivist conception of acting for reasons by showing that an account of acting for reasons should give a place to knowledge. This disjunctive conception is claimed to have a role analogous to that of the disjunctive conception that John McDowell recommends in thinking about perception; and it is shown that the two conceptions have work to do in combination when they are treated as counterparts. It is also claimed that the disjunctive conception of acting for reasons safeguards the connection between what moves us to act (sometimes called ‘motivating reasons’) and what favours our acting (sometimes called ‘normative reasons’).
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