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Epistemic Value$
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Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199231188

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.001.0001

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Practical Reasoning and the Concept of Knowledge

Practical Reasoning and the Concept of Knowledge

Chapter:
(p.163) 7 Practical Reasoning and the Concept of Knowledge
Source:
Epistemic Value
Author(s):

Matthew Weiner

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.003.0008

Hawthorne has argued for subject-sensitive invariantism, on which whether a speaker knows that p depends on whether her practical environment makes it appropriate for her to use p in practical reasoning. It may seem that this view yields a straightforward account of why knowledge is epistemically valuable, based on the role of knowledge in practical reasoning. In this chapter it is argued that, on the contrary, practical reasoning does not motivate us to care about knowledge in itself. At best, practical reasoning motivates us to care about several other concepts in themselves, and ascriptions of knowledge provide economical summaries of these independently epistemically valuable desiderata.

Keywords:   epistemic value, knowledge, practical reasoning, subject-sensitive invariantism, Hawthorne

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