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Epistemic Value$
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Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199231188

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.001.0001

Is There a Value Problem?

Chapter:
(p.42) 2 Is There a Value Problem?
Source:
Epistemic Value
Author(s):

Jason Baehr (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.003.0003

According to the ‘value problem’ in epistemology, any plausible analysis of knowledge must imply that knowledge is always more valuable than mere true belief. In this chapter it is argued that the problem thus conceived is not a genuine problem. It is widely held that the value problem is motivated by a certain intuition about the added value of knowledge compared with mere true belief. It is argued here that the intuition in question is neither sufficiently general nor sufficiently formal to play the suggested motivating role. The chapter concludes with a sketch of a very different and more plausible conception of the value problem.

Keywords:   analysis of knowledge, epistemic axiology, epistemic desiderata, epistemic value, value epistemology, value of knowledge, value problem

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