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Epistemic Value$
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Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199231188

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.001.0001

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Epistemic Normativity

Epistemic Normativity

Chapter:
(p.243) 11 Epistemic Normativity
Source:
Epistemic Value
Author(s):

Stephen R. Grimm

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.003.0012

Among contemporary epistemologists, the most prominent way to make sense of epistemic evaluations is in teleological terms. On this way of looking at things, a belief earns positive marks just to the extent that it seems to promote or in some way bring about things with intrinsic epistemic value. By focusing on the role that the notion of intrinsic epistemic value plays in these accounts, this chapter argues the majority of these views are flawed. The chapter then turns to Sosa's version of the view, which escapes some of these problems but only by leaving out the deontological force of our epistemic evaluations. The chapter then develops a proposal of my own, which seems to avoid these problems.

Keywords:   epistemic evaluation, epistemic value, epistemology, Sosa, normativity

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