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Epistemic Value$
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Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199231188

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.001.0001

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Luck, Knowledge, and Control

Luck, Knowledge, and Control

Chapter:
(p.204) 9 Luck, Knowledge, and Control
Source:
Epistemic Value
Author(s):

Wayne D. Riggs

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.003.0010

A variety of ‘anti-luck’ theories of knowledge have recently been defended in the epistemological literature, but the nature of luck itself is contentious. Two prominent recent accounts of luck are the ‘lack of control’ theory and the ‘safety’ theory. This chapter undertakes a two-part defense of the former as against the latter—specifically, against Duncan Pritchard's version of the safety account. The first part argues that Pritchard's modal definition of luck falls to decisive counterexamples, both as a core notion of luck, and as a component in his theory of knowledge. The second part addresses an important objection that strikes at the heart of the lack of control account, the response to which illuminates some interesting features of luck that must be taken into account by any adequate theory.

Keywords:   control, knowledge, Pritchard, luck, safety

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