Virtue and Enjoyment
This chapter shows that the analogy with practical skill illuminates a perhaps surprising aspect of virtue: the difference between the virtuous person, who acts virtuously readily and with pleasure, and the person who does the virtuous thing, but reluctantly and without enjoyment. The work of Csikszentmihaly offers contemporary support for the Aristotelian idea that enjoyment is to be found in wholehearted engagement in expert activity, something we have seen by now is found also in virtuous activity. Enjoyment in virtuous activity focuses the person on the activity, not on her own feelings, and illuminates other aspects of virtue, including the fact that we recognize the difference between ready and reluctant virtuous activity without a developed vocabulary to describe it; this is also the case with practical skills.
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