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Pleasure, Mind, and SoulSelected Papers in Ancient Philosophy$
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C. C. W. Taylor

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199226399

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226399.001.0001

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Plato and Aristotle on the Criterion of Real Pleasures

Plato and Aristotle on the Criterion of Real Pleasures

Chapter:
(p.91) 6 Plato and Aristotle on the Criterion of Real Pleasures
Source:
Pleasure, Mind, and Soul
Author(s):

C. C. W. Taylor

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226399.003.0006

This chapter examines the attempts by Plato and Aristotle to establish which, among the great variety of pleasures, are genuine pleasures, as opposed to not being pleasures at all, or being pleasures only in some qualified sense. Both appeal to the judgement of a certain type of person as authoritative, but the types of person are different. In Republic Book IX, Plato argues that the philosopher's judgement is authoritative because he excels other types of person in intelligence, reason, and experience of the various types of pleasure. It is argued that this argument fails because only a devotee of a given type of pleasure has the appropriate experience of it, and the philosopher cannot be a devotee of the pleasures of the body and of ambition. Aristotle's criterion in the Nicomachean Ethics is the judgement of the person in sound condition, including physical and psychological health, but he is unable to identify the appropriately sound condition independently of the person's having the right kind of pleasures. He appears to suggest in the Eudemian Ethics that it may be possible to identify genuine pleasures independently of anyone's judgement by direct appeal to the proper functioning of human nature.

Keywords:   criterion, pleasure, intelligence, reason, experience, qualified and unqualified predicates, human nature, ergon, function

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