This book is concerned with the proper nature and scope of criminal responsibility. The book takes a philosophical rather than a doctrinal approach to this question: it is concerned with how the best understanding of criminal responsibility should shape the law, not with the law as it actually is. The general account of criminal responsibility that it provides is based on the relationship between the action performed and the character of the agent performing it. An action can be attributed to a defendant, it is argued, only if that action is connected in the proper way to the agent's character ... More

This book is concerned with the proper nature and scope of criminal responsibility. The book takes a philosophical rather than a doctrinal approach to this question: it is concerned with how the best understanding of criminal responsibility should shape the law, not with the law as it actually is. The general account of criminal responsibility that it provides is based on the relationship between the action performed and the character of the agent performing it. An action can be attributed to a defendant, it is argued, only if that action is connected in the proper way to the agent's character. The book then goes on to explore the philosophical foundations of a number of the most important doctrines of criminal responsibility in the light of this view. These include the role of causation, the extent to which we can be held responsible for failing to prevent harm, the significance of intentions to the definition of crimes, the proper definition of recklessness as well as a range of issues in criminal defences.