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Oughts and ThoughtsScepticism and the Normativity of Meaning$
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Anandi Hattiangadi

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199219025

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219025.001.0001

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Reductionism

Reductionism

Chapter:
(p.105) 5 Reductionism
Source:
Oughts and Thoughts
Author(s):

Anandi Hattiangadi (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219025.003.0005

This chapter considers more sophisticated reductionist responses to the sceptical argument — that is those which seek to find the fact that constitutes someone's meaning something by a word among the causal, physical, or functional facts. It considers a wide variety of the most compelling reductive theories that have been presented in response to Kripke's scepticism, and argues that each of these fails.

Keywords:   Kripke, reductive theory, sceptical argument, dispositionalist theory, success semantics, teleosemantics, Fodor

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