Background to a Mission: Pre-Austrian Bosnia and the Powers
Background to a Mission: Pre-Austrian Bosnia and the Powers
Abstract and Keywords
In a memorandum to the European powers of 21 April 1878, making the case for a Habsburg occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, Gyula Andrássy, argued that an autonomous Bosnia-Herzegovina lacked the means to overcome internal divisions and maintain its existence against its neighbours. According to Andrassy, only a strong state could initiate the internal development of these lands, establish equality before the law, eliminate murder and rapine, and advance trade and agriculture in an environment of stability and progress. This chapter confirms Karl Sax's 1864 observation on the essence of the nationality problem in Bosnia: the conjunction of ethnical uniformity and political division. It also shows how this situation had evolved and why Austria-Hungary felt it convenient that mere allusion to contemporary notions of civilizing mission could legitimize its takeover of two provinces from a friendly power.
In a memorandum to the European powers of 21 April 1878, making the case for a Habsburg occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, Gyula Andrássy, struck an altruistic note. An autonomous Bosnia-Herzegovina, he argued, lacked the means to overcome internal divisions and maintain its existence against its neighbours. Only a strong state could set in train the internal development of these lands, establish equality before the law, eliminate murder and rapine, and advance trade and agriculture in an environment of stability and progress.1 In short, Andrássy proposed a cultural mission, to use the snappy phrase variously echoed by a host of authors in connection with his request.2
The reasons for this request were, of course, matters of high policy, in which the cultural state of Bosnia played only an incidental role. In the wake of Turkey's defeat in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–78, Andrássy made no bones of the fact that the Monarchy wished to prevent the formation of a large south Slav state in the Balkans. The impact of developments on these lines could be extremely destabilizing for the still unconsolidated Dualist system, established in 1867 at the expense of the half of the Monarchy's subjects who were Slavs. It was highly convenient that mere allusion to contemporary notions of civilizing mission could legitimize Austria-Hungary's takeover of two provinces from a friendly power.
What made for the potency of the slogan? The later nineteenth century saw European confidence and prestige at its zenith. A century of unparalleled economic, scientific and educational progress was associated with the espousal of rationalist, increasingly secular norms and notions of constitutional government rooted in respect for civic society. In the dawning age of imperialism the sense of European superiority was fostered by the decline of the Ottoman empire, long a feared rival. Whereas European commentaries on the Ottomans in earlier times had mixed positive and negative features, from the mid-eighteenth century the latter perceptions hardened into stereotype.3 The energy, drive, curiosity and goal-directed desire for improvement rooted in the Enlightenment were opposed to the lethargy, conservatism and disorder, however picturesque, of the non-European Other, rooted in religious fatalism. These western attitudes were (p.2) no less prevalent in the German cultural sphere of which the Monarchy was still deemed part. The greatest European authority on the Ottoman empire, Joseph von Hammer (1774–1856), a graduate of Vienna's famous Oriental Academy, concluded his history with reference to its ‘incurable malady’, at least in its European half.4 If Goethe showed interest in eastern culture it was as of a patriarchal world of ‘primal simplicity’, reflecting the West's arrogation to itself of the status of the modern and objectively real, as by Edward Said's famous thesis, though arguably Goethe was aware of the element of western fantasy involved.5 Eastern society, when understood by German science, and in fusion with western culture, could help prepare the way for a brighter future, claimed the president of the German Oriental Society in 1856; but ‘everything in the East of the present day is in a state of deep-seated lethargy and decay in state, church, school, family, learning and art’.6
That Bosnia, Ottoman for four centuries, like the Balkans as a whole was part of this Oriental picture was quite patent to contemporary observers. Even those sympathetic to the Balkan Christians set them firmly in the context of Oriental backwardness. The English traveller Adeline Irby wrote of Bosnia's ‘savage and Oriental aspect’; the highest compliment Andrew Paton could pay ‘primitive’ Serbs, children in civilization, was that they were healthy children.7 But the small educated minority among Balkan Christians staked their aspirations for national regeneration precisely on the claim to be Europeans, seeking admittance to the circle of European civilization whose dress some of them increasingly affected and through whose leading languages they gained access to European ideas. Not denying the backwardness of the great bulk of their compatriots, they sought to be active instruments of their ‘enlightenment’, rather than objects of a process designed to legitimize Great Power occupation. In this clash between Habsburg and native Balkan claims to embody the spirit of European progress lay a fateful source of future confrontation.
Yet the potential for improvement some glimpsed in lowly Balkan Christians was not credited to the ‘fatalistic Mohammedan Osmanli, resigned to his unchangeable lot’, in the phrase of Felix Kanitz, most Serbophile of nineteenthcentury German-language writers.8 In Bosnia, in the scenario created by 1878, occupiers and native Christians alike contested the inheritance of the Muslims, whom each saw only as material to be shaped to their own vision, whether as bulwarks against Slav nationalism in the Habsburg case, or as Serbs or Croats restored to the national fold. What is striking in hindsight is the power of Eurocentric assumptions to play down the tenacity of a Muslim civilization which for long periods had outmatched Europe and which still provided a cultural matrix for a vast area from west Africa to China. These three protagonists, the occupiers, the native Christians and the Bosnian face of Islam, were to be the main actors in the drama which followed. The society which the new rulers encountered was a dauntingly complex one. There were 1,412 Orthodox villages, 793 Muslim and 437 Catholic, together with a slightly higher number of mixed (p.3) settlements,9 forming a collective conundrum, the gist of which had been well put by an Austrian official in 1864:
Whereas the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina linguistically and historically is for the greater part nationally uniform, the situation as regards its actual political nationality appears quite different. Just as in the Orient in general the concepts of nation and religious community have been confused, so in particular the Southern Slav nation in Turkey is divided according to confession into three sharply differentiated ‘nationalities’ which have no desire for mutual contact, viz. the Serbs, that is the Greek Orthodox Christians, the Latins or Roman Catholic Christians and the Turks, that is, the Muslims.10
Sax accurately pinpointed the essence of the nationality problem in Bosnia which continues to frustrate its rulers: the conjunction of common cultural traits and divergent aspirations. To set out how this curious situation had evolved and why Austria-Hungary felt it necessary to stir a potential hornets’ nest is the task of this opening chapter.
The Historical Background and the Bosnian Muslim Experience
A striking feature of the Bosnian experience, which opened the field for contestation in the age of nationalism, is how little certain is known about it. Bosnia first appears to history in the tenth century as a small territory centred on the valley of the River Bosna. Except in some Bosniak views, the word is not taken, unlike Croatia and Serbia, to refer to a particular branch of the south Slavs who settled in the Balkans in the seventh century, but like the names of most major rivers in the region is assumed to be of pre-Roman origin. Their valleys, cutting roughly northwards to the river Sava or bending south-west to the Adriatic, help to define a wedge of territory in the west Balkan mountain massif which has a certain geographic unity. By the fourteenth century the Bosnian state had expanded to include almost all of modern Bosnia-Herzegovina and, more briefly, land beyond, becoming a kingdom when Ban Tvrtko I took the royal title in 1377. Yet sparse evidence means it is not even known exactly when or how the first significant autonomous ruler, Ban Kulin (1180–1204), died. While he enjoyed de facto independence Tvrtko acknowledged the Hungarian suzerain, which had replaced Byzantium as the dominant power in the region, as an autonomous kingdom within the wider Hungarian realm; Croatia's historical claim to Bosnia was linked to that of Hungary. The symbolism of Tvrtko's own crown kept the powerful nobility, effective rulers in their own right, from open secession. Herzegovina's emergence under the strongest of these dates from the mid-fifteenth century.11
Uncertainty over medieval Bosnian history has been most fateful in controversy over its religion. From the late twelfth century, the medieval state and nobility (p.4) were closely aligned with the so-called ‘Bosnian Church’, which, given contradictory evidence, has been claimed variously as a dualist heresy on ‘Bogomil’ lines, essentially Orthodox, or a separate but not heretical regional development in schism with both Orthodoxy and Catholicism.12 At first a source of cohesion in the Bosnian state, the ‘Bosnian Church’ became a weakness as the Turkish threat mounted. It expanded little into Orthodox areas acquired from Serbian rule in eastern Herzegovina and north-east Bosnia, while hopes of organizing a crusade against the Turks led the Bosnian elite to abandon it for Catholicism by the 1450s, launching a persecution which may have weakened popular resistance to the Turkish conquest of 1463–65. It is not clear how far it was already losing popular support.
These obscurities were to be important for the evolution of identity in Bosnia under Ottoman rule. Traditionally, Muslims have found the ‘Bogomil theory’ congenial, assuming their descent from heretics who preferred Islam to the persecution of the mainstream churches. It situates them as the autochthonous population of Bosnia, as against fringe populations of medieval Catholic and Orthodox. Turkish records, however, do not confirm traditions of an initial mass conversion. Continuity of the new Bosnian Muslim elite with the medieval one has been described as ‘only moderate’, particularly as far as the higher aristocracy is concerned. The issue of continuity touches on the longevity of a specifically Bosnian patriotic tradition.13 But it is clear that whatever its origins the new elite quickly acquired a Bosnian identity, and Islamicization proceeded so steadily that a document of 1604 made Bosnia at least three-quarters Sunni Muslim.14 Recent scholarship has seen a rediscovery of Ottoman Bosnian culture, long shadowed by non-Muslim perceptions of centuries of Turkish misrule.15 The sixteenth century was its golden age, in which Sarajevo, Mostar, Banjaluka and many other towns were founded and equipped with the commercial and cultural institutions of a quintessentially urban civilization: mosques, hans, caravanserai, madrassas, mektebs, tekkes, libraries, baths and fountains, including the jewels of the Begova and Careva mosques in Sarajevo and the bridge in Mostar.16 From 1513 only Bosnians could hold timars (Ottoman fiefs) on Bosnian soil, which from 1593 could be inherited, a provision unique in the empire. Bosnians quickly became proficient in the three classical Islamic languages of Arabic, Persian and Turkish, producing some 700 known titles by some 375 authors in the Turkish period, while also writing their own language in Arabic script, the so-called alhamijado literature.17 The Ottoman empire, as universalistic at its height as that of the Romans, induced a reorientation of Bosnian elites towards Constantinople and imperial service which lasted well into the Austrian period. The flourishing of culture went with an undoubted improvement of the condition of the common people, accompanied by their acculturation to Oriental lifestyle. In these circumstances Islamicization was a peaceful process, though monopolization of public office by Muslims, and legal discrimination, made Ottoman tolerance as different from modern ideas (p.5) of civic equality as it was from the intolerance of contemporary Christian states.
By 1878 the glory days of this culture were long gone. Lacking a stream of revenue from fresh conquests, the cultural infrastructure was only shakily maintained through increased taxation of the Christian peasantry. Yet it seems likely that it was in the years of decline that a Bosnian Muslim or Bosniak identity defined itself most strongly vis-à-vis the empire. The loss of Hungary and Slavonia to Austria by the Treaty of Karlowitz (Sremski Karlovci) in 1699 made Bosnia a border outpost in which many displaced Muslims settled, reinforcing an embattled warrior mentality in its ruling class. The victory of local forces over Austria in the battle of Banjaluka in 1737 is increasingly seen as ensuring the survival of Bosnian Muslims as a unique people. The songs which developed around the battle, as over the escapades of the Morići brothers, popular leaders in social strife in mid-eighteenth-century Sarajevo, testify to a community with its own structures and traditions, whose hegemony non-Muslim Bosnians acknowledged—the Orthodox metropolitan of Sarajevo was at hand in support at Banjaluka, and Franciscans also contributed to the defence.18 Modelled in part on the Austrian Military Frontier institution, the heritable kapetanije lordships led to distinctive elements of autonomy under native landowners, amid a rising insecurity, however, which brought the first Bosnian criticisms of the power of Istanbul to protect them.19 A mass base for Bosniak identity was strengthened due to the fact that by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the great bulk of Muslim peasants held free as opposed to dependent (raya) status).20 However, the opening up of this gap with a much more dependent Christian population made Christian disaffection part of a threefold threat to Muslim Bosnia by the nineteenth century, together with Austria on the frontier and an Ottoman central power determined to reassert its control. By this time the Muslim population had possibly lost its absolute majority, affected by losses in constant wars in the Ottoman cause and by epidemics strongest in the Muslim-dominated towns.
Istanbul struck first. Bosnian resistance to centralizing measures, as in the 1831 revolt under Husein Gradašćević, in Muslim recollection the ‘Dragon of Bosnia’, was long depicted as a feudal elite's obscurantist resistance to reform. It is now presented by Bosniak historians as a crystallization point of a Bosnian national consciousness and programme, concerned not so much with the cry of ‘Islam in peril’ as to affirm Bosnian autonomy within the empire. Insistence here on a continuity of Bosnian state tradition (the term used connotes German notions of Staatsrecht) fits east European nationalist ideology too closely to carry full conviction. Claims, for example, that Gradašćević's movement aimed at a bourgeois civil society for a multiconfessional Bosnian nation are the exaggerations of a young historiography.21 The Ottoman government succeeded in dividing the rebel forces, particularly in Herzegovina, demonstrating an importance of locality which remained true of the Austrian period too. Nonetheless, the existence of a strong Bosnian Muslim identity with its own historical perspective remains an (p.6) important conclusion to draw from the Gradašćević movement, with relevance for what was to come.
The final eclipse of the Bosnian aristocracy's resistance to the centre by Omer Pasha in 1850–51 marked, for the father of modern Bosniak historiography, Safvet-beg Bašagić (1870–1934), the end of Bosnian freedom and of the energetic, progressive role of ‘the old Bosnian-Herzegovinian elite’ for the common good.22 His picture of psychological disorientation in the wake of these blows appears persuasive. The predominant response to defeat was recourse to a religious conservatism which had lost its creative spark, though in institutional terms it remained outwardly impressive. In the 1870s the occupied provinces had about 1,000 mosques, 900 mektebs, or Koranic primary schools, and perhaps 50 madrassas, or religious secondary schools.23 Kadis in the forty-odd district towns administered the sharia or Muslim law, while muftis in the half dozen sandžak towns offered judgements (fatwas) on points of Islamic principle. According to a record of 1870, over 41,000 Muslim children attended a mekteb, as against less than 4,000 Christian schoolchildren.24 The problem was that these institutions no longer functioned adequately, as Vali ordinances of 1822, 1833 and 1856 reiterated.25 Political instability and often irresponsible administrators lessened the value of the inalienable endowments (Arabic waqf; in Turkish and Bosnian, vakuf), which maintained pious projects and public utilities like schools and hospitals, as well as fountains in the Islamic world. Mektebs taught children to read the Koran in Arabic by rote; madrassas, where students commonly spent twelve to fifteen years, had over the centuries dropped from their syllabuses all but Arabic grammar and religious subjects.26 Bosnia had become economically one of the most backward areas of the Ottoman empire. Most remarkable was that conservatism kept literary production at a manuscript level. Not till 1866 did Bosnia acquire a printing press, through the initiative of the energetic Turkish governor, Osman Pasha.
Osman Pasha (1861–69) was earnest that the Tanzimat, or Turkish reform period, had finally arrived in Bosnia.27 Though imperial Ottoman edicts of 1839 and 1856 had formally introduced the principle of civic equality of Muslim and non-Muslim, the conqueror of the Bosnian nobility, Omer Pasha, laughed when the Austrian consul taxed him with the discrepancy between the regime's theory and practice, and said he should not believe everything he read in the newspapers.28 By contrast, Osman Pasha built Bosnia's roads fit for wheeled traffic, constructed many European-style public buildings, notably in Sarajevo, and launched Bosnian journalism through his press's official journals, though he was too masterful to relish the advisory provincial council which Istanbul required him to appoint.29 Moreover, he opened several of the Tanzimat's trademark (ružijas), state interconfessional schools teaching secular subjects, and he subsidized Christian schools, even sending his daughter to one. What light does his work cast on Austria-Hungary's claim to be inaugurating a process of (p.7) modernization in Bosnia, and on the Serbs’ charge against Austrian rule that it showed them less tolerance than the Turks?
Osman Pasha's administration certainly anticipated Austria's in its main lines, but the incompetence of the seven governors who followed him between 1869 and 1874 showed how far his were personal achievements. The British consul, a consistent Turkophile in the 1860s, could hardly find words in the 1870s to condemn the ‘infamously corrupt, fanatical and ignorant’ Turkish courts, the ‘bribery, corruption and religious fanaticism’ which were the ‘motive power of the whole system of government’, and the ‘thousand petty vexations by which the Turk endeavours to assert his superiority’ at the Christian's expense.30 Besides the failure of land reform was the fact that, as the Ottoman empire modernized, it abandoned the laissez-faire attitude which constituted its traditional tolerance of non-Muslim affairs and sought to regulate these on the pattern of western states. The Ottoman School Law of 1869 ordered that confessional schoolteachers should be Turkish citizens using approved textbooks and teaching Turkish. In 1874 an imperial rescript endeavoured to enforce this in Bosnia by demanding the transfer of schools from the care of disloyal ‘committees called opschtines’ (the Serb communal organizations) to that of intercommunal local political authorities.31 The 1860s and 1870s were a time of mounting government pressure on Serb national feeling. Educational and religious leaders were expelled or imprisoned, textbooks confiscated, foreign south Slav newspapers banned and the expressions ‘Bosnian language’ and ‘Bosnian nation’ enforced at the expense of the suspect term ‘Serb’.32 Osman Pasha was a bitter opponent of ‘Panslavism’.33 Any idea that late Ottoman Bosnia was on top of mounting ethno-confessional tensions would be wishful thinking. It is interesting that when the Christian revolt broke out in 1875, the native Muslims blamed it on the Tanzimat.34
Yet it would be wrong to see the Ottoman legacy solely in terms of Bosnian Muslims sunk in resentful conservatism, and a failed project of alien centralization. It is not just that the Muslim population inherited centuries of proud tradition as a bulwark of Islam, embattled defenders of a culture both universalistic and richly diverse. There were also the ties to the Slavic environment, embodied in memories alive in various lineages of a medieval ancestry, in traditions of heroic poetry and the sevdalinke love songs of Muslim women, in alhamijado literature and in the knowledge individual families retained of Christian scripts, particularly Cyrillic or its Bosnian variant, bosančica.35 Thus Muslims were available to edit the pathbreaking journals Sarajevki cvjetnik in Sarajevo (1868: Mohamed Šakir Kurtćehajić) and Neretva in Mostar (1876: Mehmed Hulusi Džumrukčić), and to operate publicistically in early Austrian Bosnia, like Mehmed-beg Kapetanović, a former Ottoman ruždija pupil. A man like Kurtćehajić (1844–72) breathed the same yearning for an education as a ‘European young man’ as his Christian contemporaries: ‘Sad and sorrowful are my sighs when I survey the world where (p.8) other nations from day to day advance with giant strides.’36 The complex Bosnian Muslim experience promised the bearers of ‘cultural mission’ in post-1878 Bosnia an intriguing task. How complex that experience could be may be gauged from the multiple allegiances of Mehmed Ali-paša Rizvanbegović (1849–1901), member of a great Herzegovinian family which emigrated to Turkey after Omer Pasha's conquest, where he grew up loyal to Bosnia, a Turkish patriot and also, as witness his use of Cyrillic (but as bosančica, acquired from a Franciscan), a convinced Serb.37
Orthodox Bosnians and the Serb National Movement
As the vitality of Islamic civilization declined, the Christian population began to raise itself from centuries of ignorance and lethargy. This advance was also a demographic one, perhaps nearly threefold in eighteenth-century Bosnia Herzegovina.38 It also entailed a fateful shift in the balance between Catholic and Orthodox, as migration of Catholics in the wake of Austro-Turkish wars reduced this community relatively, while the people with whom Bosnian landowners resettled abandoned areas were mainly Orthodox. Known as Vlachs, the name still in use today for the Balkans’ remaining Romance speakers, these incomers have often been depicted as not Slavs at all, but merely assimilees to Serbdom by virtue of their shared Orthodoxy. Since ‘Vlach’ had acquired the secondary meaning of ‘herder’ as opposed to ‘agriculturalist’ already in the Middle Ages, however, it did not necessarily indicate non-Slav origin. To be sure, Serbs had inhabited only parts of medieval Bosnia acquired from Serbian rule, notably in the north-east and Herzegovina, while all three Orthodox sees as of 1878 had moved between various monastic localities before settling in their current seats: Sarajevo, Donja Tuzla and Mostar. The Austrian census of 1879 revealed the Orthodox as the largest Bosnian community, at 43 per cent as opposed to the Muslims’ 38 per cent and the Catholics at 18 per cent. Locally significant Sephardic Jewish communities existed in a couple of the largest towns, above all Sarajevo.
Overall numbers are not everything, however. While Muslims dominated the towns, Christians were, overwhelmingly, illiterate peasants who impressed observers by their ‘extreme abjectness of mind as the result of long and harsh serfdom’, their ignorance, poverty and fanaticism, their ‘total engrossment in the problem of daily subsistance’.39 The land question was the peasants’ overriding focus of interest. The core of the matter lay in the Ottoman state's inability to remedy the dangerous imbalance which had developed between Muslims, comprising (in 1879) almost all landowners and 95 per cent of the 77,000 free peasants, and the 85,000 families of dependent kmets who were almost (p.9) wholly Christian.40 The Tanzimat had attempted to standardize the kmets’ rights and obligations, namely to retain and pass on their plots, provided they kept them in cultivation and supplied a third of their crop (the trećina) to the landlord and a tithe (the desetina) to the state. But the Ottoman state lacked the resources to carry out such a complex reform; the Bosnian landlord class (at some 5–6000 strong41) sought to utilize any change to strengthen their position as landowners at the kmets’ expense—by legal tradition, most land belonged to the Sultan—and the upshot was that the position of the peasants if anything declined. The Catholic Bishop of Bosnia, Marijan Šunjić, reported that kmets now retained only 35 per cent of their crops.42 Upheavals where landlord pressure was particularly strong helped bring about a general land law for the empire (1858), ambiguous and plentifully revised, and a specific regulation for Bosnia, the law of Shefer (1859), which reaffirmed the terms outlined above. It is easy to see how Austria could exploit the land problem as evidence of Turkey's terminal incompetence. In practice, the difficulties of land reform are notorious, and more so where ethno-confessional issues are involved. Like the Irish land question in the nineteenth century, the Bosnian case became an immense imbroglio, in which complaint, commission, legislation and tumult chased tail down the decades. In the event, the law of Shefer was to remain the basis of Bosnian agrarian relations until 1918.43
Serb national aspirations among the Orthodox population were therefore a matter of a small, cautious and moreover divided elite. For by the Ottoman millet system, which made religion the basis of ethnicity and allowed non-Muslim religious hierarchies to manage their own affairs, Serbs since the abolition of their own Patriarchate of Peć in the eighteenth century had been assigned to the Greek millet under the Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople. Their bishops in Bosnia were regularly Greeks or at best Hellenized Slavs, known as Phanariots from the Greek quarter of Constantinople, the Phanar.44 Usually ignorant of the language, these ‘baptized Turks’ and ‘clerical hyenas’ in a hostile view,45 acquired a bad reputation for recouping the cost of their appointment at the expense of their Slav flock. Below them, the handful of monasteries, ten in 1878, were poor and sparsely inhabited, an exception perhaps being Žitomislínear Mostar. An Austrian estimate of 1882 was that two-thirds of the 350 or so parochial clergy had had no more education than a training to read sections of the Scriptures from their fathers—for the priesthood was commonly hereditary.46 Should they attend primary school and go beyond, it was to seminaries in Belgrade, Karlowitz in Hungary, Prizren in Kosovo or exceptionally Russia, though the briefly successful seminary of Vaso Pelagić in Banjaluka (1868–75) did provide many of the Bosnian clergy under Austria. For all the ignorance that shocked foreign observers, the Orthodox clergy, often themselves kmets, were traditionally close to the people, on whose offerings they relied. ‘He [the Orthodox peasant] holds the priest for God and believes everything from him’, (p.10) the mid-century prophet of Bosnian enlightenment, fra Ivan Franjo Jukić, had written.47
Yet the nineteenth century had seen the rise of a significant Serb urban class in Bosnia which now claimed from the traditional religious leaders the dominant role in the Orthodox community. In Banjaluka, for example, 60 Serb householders in 1850 had become a Serb population of 1,893 in 1879.48 There, and elsewhere, Orthodox merchants entered into their own as trade came to be orientated north and west towards Austria, and Bosnian Serb merchant colonies sprang up in Trieste, Dubrovnik, along the Sava, and in Vienna itself. ‘The control of trade and the greater part of its profits are exclusively in the hands of the Greek Oriental commercial class which in general possesses the fluid capital of the province’, wrote the Austrian official Thoemmel in 1867.49 Moreover, Serbs monopolized the farming of the state tithe, and a number even profited from the freedom granted Christians under the Tanzimat to become kmet owners themselves.50
This wealthy merchant body dominated the Orthodox church communes, the like of which existed all over the Orthodox world, to attend to administrative aspects of the church and, where there was one, the school. According to the most prestigious contemporary Serb theologian, this sphere of action represented a Byzantine erosion of the original lay role, when the laity had also had a role in the appointment of bishops and priests.51 While ecclesiastical dominance of Church affairs prevailed in modern Orthodox states like Russia and Serbia, in Turkey and particularly Bosnia, with its alien hierarchy, circumstances lent much greater influence to the lay-dominated communes. Thus the commune in Sarajevo gained the metropolitan's written approval of its right to participate in the appointment of priests as early as 1734.52 An Austrian document of 1879 says quite simply that priests were elected by the local commune.53 But communal organizations existed only in a few dozen urban centres—there were twenty-six in Sarajevo diocese in 1873.54 The right of these to hold annual assemblies, to elect a management committee, usually for three years, to build schools, appoint teachers and priests and control funds constituted for the Serb communes their much-vaunted autonomy. The merchants’ leading role appeared in Sarajevo commune, where the six representatives of their guild on the committee outnumbered all artisan members put together.55 In the contrast between the organized communes and the rural hinterland, and between the Phanariots and the native clergy, Bosnian Orthodoxy thus markedly displayed the gulf between town and country and upper and lower clergy which has been seen as characteristic of Orthodoxy in general.56 Both features were to be crucial in disputes over Serb Orthodox cultural autonomy under the Austrian occupation.
The national programme under which the communes came to fight Austria was foreshadowed in the final stages of Turkish rule. Despite the restrictions on higher clergy's due-levying power, decided by a representative body of Orthodox (p.11) in Constantinople in 1857–60, and their eventual adoption in Bosnia, the metropolitans continued their old ways.57 In 1873 matters came to a head in Sarajevo diocese. An eparchial (diocesan) assembly, convoked despite the metropolitan's reluctance, drafted a statute creating a largely lay consistorial court, which would be effectively an executive committee for regular future assemblies, with central supervision over Serb schools. While the metropolitan hesitated, the Turkish governor appeared before the assembly and declared that only the government could exercise such a supervisory role.58 The assembly's vice-president was the wealthy merchant Dimitrije Jeftanović, while the kmet owner Petro Petrović also stood up against the metropolitan for the assembly's right to be heard. Traditionally, the richest merchants had been seen as selfinterested supporters of the system by such diverse observers as the radical paper Zastava, the Serbian statesman Ilija Garašanin, and the Slavophile Russian consul in Sarajevo, Hilferding.59 By the 1870s the Serb urban class had acquired greater psychological self-assurance. Even the anti-merchant Zastava bore witness, as to a new departure, to the participation of young Gradiška merchants in the 1875 rising, stirred by ‘reading and study of radical writings’ and zest for battle ‘in the name of humanity and freedom’.60
The phraseology indicates the origin of the ideas the young merchants were imbibing. It was ‘Europe’, identification with which became the touchstone of Serb nationalists’ growing sense of power vis-à-vis the declining ‘Asiatic’ Turks. From the litany of European liberal nationalism Serbs acquired, or at least reshaped, the national idea itself. Returning from their studies in France and Germany, the nascent intelligentsia of autonomous Serbia found it galling to accept that millions of their countrymen, in the language of the time, groaned under Oriental despotism. The dream of restoring the medieval empire of Dušan the Mighty (though it did not include Bosnia) could access historical traditions celebrated in Serb folk poetry by people not much troubled by European ideas. Through the more mobile elements in the population, like merchants and teachers, this composite of heroic past and European destiny could spread from the most active centres of Serbdom via the trading towns of northern Bosnia, to Sarajevo, Mostar and by degrees beyond. The term ‘Serb’ had currency in Bosnia—though Jukić claimed not to have heard it on his Bosnian travels61—but in line with the Balkan coupling of ethnicity with religion it arguably had Orthodox as much as national connotations.62 Now it was to be the instrument of a new consciousness, symbolized by the setting up of a society in Sarajevo some time after 1863 to eliminate use of the disparaging term ‘Vlach’ and, in the historian Skarić's words, ‘bring in the name “Serb” ’.63 This was nation-building in action.
In the larger centres, a number of energetic immigrants had introduced elements of modern Serb school organization into Bosnia from the mid-nineteenth century onwards: a four-year course with graded, textbook based material, secular subjects, phonetic reading and where possible a school fund to guarantee teachers’ (p.12) regular salaries. A start was made also with commercial education, which led, in Sarajevo in 1864, to the foundation of a four-year realka, modelled on the German Realschule, and with the education of girls, through the Sarajevo schools of the charismatic Staka Skenderova and the philanthropic Englishwoman Adeline Irby.64 More than half the 113 Serb schools whose foundation before 1878 can be ascertained, however, were village schools reflecting few, if any, of these innovations.65 Their flickering fortunes, dependent on the relations of individual teachers with the communities to which they offered their services, meant that in 1879 Austrian officials recorded only 56 Serb schools in existence, attended by some 3,500 in a Serb population of 600,000.66 Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to underestimate the importance of the educational movement, which in larger towns was already bound up with national politics, as it was to remain under Austria.
Symptomatic of Serbs’ late development is that their lay leaders continued to be mainly immigrants to Bosnia, while the native leaders were clerics. Among the former were the Dalmatians Stevo and Bogoljub Petranović, the first the leader of lay opposition to the metropolitan in the eparchial assembly of 1873, the second a Serb government agent, member of the Omladina, pioneering publisher of Bosnian folk poetry and director of Sarajevo commune's schools from 1865 to 1869, when he was expelled by the Turks. But more remarkable was the native Bosnian archimandrite Vaso Pelagić (1838–99), founder of the nationally minded seminary in Banjaluka in 1866, which three years later brought him before a Turkish court. ‘Right, freedom and national dignity’, he told it, ‘cannot be won by yielding and requests, only by struggle and work.’67 Later, in his autobiography, he explained his stand:
I wanted through my sufferings and the questions I raised to spur the people to protest and intellectual endeavour, for it is only in this way that wits will be sharpened … against force and injustice … and the consciousness awakened without which we will not be able to realize our aspirations.68
After escaping from Turkish exile, Pelagíc wandered the south Slav world, extending his denunciation of arbitrary rule from Turkey to Serbia and Montenegro and eventually becoming a socialist and atheist, who never returned to Bosnia. A less unorthodox figure was another archimandrite, Sava Kosanović (1839–1903), like Pelagić of poor peasant stock. Driven by his ‘thirst for knowledge’ in the nineteenth-century phrase, to walk from Žitomislić monastery to study in Belgrade seminary, he served as priest and teacher in Mostar and then in the Sarajevo realka, contributing articles on Bosnian folklore and history and touring Russia for funds for Sarajevo's new Orthodox church. An energetic and ambitious man, the best qualified of native clergy, the visit contributed to his reputation for Panslavism.69 Other notable clerics were the abbot of Žitomislić, Serafim Perović, and Nićifor Dučić, co-founders of a short-lived seminary in Herzegovina (1858–60). Dučić became head of a Serbian Foreign Ministry department (p.13) dealing with Serb schools in Turkey. Perović, like Kosanovića future bishop under Austria, spent the years 1870 to 1876 in prison for his work as a Serbian agent.
A thin layer of educated Bosnian Serbs was thus emerging, which had quite a clear view of its allegiances. Its world was being shaped within a pan-Serb Orthodox framework, with the help of reform-minded individuals with their own kind of cultural mission, from Vojvodina and Dalmatia, and with an overarching reference point in autonomous Belgrade. Insurrectionary traditions were territorially limited, to the semi-tribesmen of the Herzegovinian Montenegrin border, where Luka Vukalović led a series of revolts (1852–62);the overwhelming majority of hard-pressed peasants shared nothing of the wider political perspective. But the British consul's assessment, in 1875, that the position of Christian townspeople had ‘immeasurably improved during the last quarter of a century, but I do not think that the agrarian population is much better off than it was thirty years ago’, boded ill for authority.70 It meant a boosting of confidence of the educated and a reservoir of discontent in the masses, which the former could seek to turn to national ends. This combination would face Austria too.
The Bosnian Catholics
Of the three main confessions Catholics were the least widely spread, being most strongly represented in western Herzegovina and central and south-west Bosnia. They were also the poorest, for though quite numerous in Travnik, Mostar and Livno, they lacked the urban elite of the Serbs. This position actually represented a recovery from the low point of the early eighteenth century, due in part to immigration from Dalmatia. It was a recovery accompanied by a weakening of certain customs Catholics had shared with many other Bosnians, but it was not linked to a rise of national consciousness to the same extent as with the Serbs. The great bulk of Bosnian Catholics continued to identify themselves as ‘Latins’ and their language as ‘Slav’, ‘Bosnian’ or simply ‘ours’. Relations with Orthodox Christians were poisoned by mutual attempts to invoke the Sultan's authority against the other.71
The most notable feature of Bosnian Catholic life was its domination by the Franciscan Order. Introduced into Bosnia in the thirteenth century, the Franciscans had made themselves the indispensable protagonists of Catholicism against both the ‘Bosnian Church’ and later Islam, acquiring the exclusive right to provide priests for Bosnian parishes (the ‘cure of souls’) and providing from their midst the apostolic vicars who held the post of titular bishop in Bosnia from the mid-eighteenth century. The original bishops of Bosnia had taken up residence in Đakovo in Slavonia in the medieval period and lost touch with their flock. The result was a potentially divisive dualism in Bosnian Catholic organization. On (p.14) the one side stood the Franciscan Bishop, or Apostolic Vicar, and on the other the Provincial of the Franciscan Province of Bosnia Argentina, elected every three years by the heads of the individual monasteries. The bishop had no control over the economic management of the monasteries, and for the clergy he had only the right to confirm appointments. The majority of Franciscans, moved from parish to parish each six years by the monastery to which the parish was subject, were therefore rarely under monastic discipline.72 Under the Tanzimat the number of monasteries, long reduced to three, had risen to eight in Bosnia and two in Herzegovina. Observers credited them with a higher cultural standard than existed elsewhere in Bosnia; Franciscans often completed their studies in Hungary or Italy. Hilferding called Bishop Šunjić in the 1850s ‘a jewel in any clergy because of his high learning and moral character’.73 Since the seventeenth century Franciscans had produced a corpus of significant literary and historical work, while not matching the kind of parochial education equally remote, early modern Estonia, say, received.
By 1878, however, their position was not uncontroversial. The Italian consul had commented that their parochial role made them ‘quite far from strict observation of the rule of the order’; the British vice-consul in Mostar that they were rapacious and ‘did not in the least exert themselves to ameliorate the moral condition of their flock, which, in general, is most degraded’.74 Though themselves Franciscans, bishops were suspected by the Bosnian Provincialate of threatening its privileges. In 1846 Bishop Barišić had to be shifted from his post to a newly created Apostolic Vicariate in Herzegovina, accompanied by a split in the Province too which led eventually (1892) to a separate Herzegovinian Province. Service which had been appreciated ‘in partibus infidelium’ (the lands of the unbelievers) was looked at differently in high places when the Tanzimat loosened the reins and quarrels between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and Slav nationalists appeared to offer the Catholic Church openings in the Balkans. The Province of Bosnia Argentina was subject to seven visitations and its Constitution twice suspended in a period of forty years, at a time when internal wranglings in the Franciscan Order had also lowered its prestige in the Vatican.75
Political aspirations of younger Franciscans added another strand to the story. From the 1840s began the association of certain Bosnian Franciscans with the various forms of nineteenth-century south Slav nationalism. Ivan Franjo Jukí (1818–57), an ardent Illyrian but also a Bosnian patriot, was the first Bosnian Catholic to formulate a programme of national enlightenment (prosvjeta), the word which was to become synonymous with later generations’ modernizing dreams; politically, he worked for Bosnian autonomy under the Tanzimat. Illyrian sympathies could broaden into active Serbophilia, as in the lauding of Serbian and Montenegrin heroism in the first part of fra Grgo Martić's epic poem Osvetnica.76 Gradually they merged into the new but similar Yugoslavism of Bishop Strossmayer of Đakovo, who built a seminary for Bosnian Franciscans (p.15) in his diocese in 1853, where a generation of Bosnians acquired a strong Slav national feeling.
The Order's official leaders avoided provoking the Turkish authorities but succeeded in coaxing concessions with Catholic consuls’ support. Here they realized the importance of Austria's backing, and their ambitions took on an increasingly Austrophile guise. Grgo Martić dropped his bardic name ‘Ilir’ (Illyrian) for the neutral ‘Hercegovac’ (Herzegovinian) and worked closely with the Austrian consul, rarely referring to himself as a Croat before the occupation. Fra Anton Knežević represented a further tendency, identifying with the medieval Bosnian kingdom and the cultural traits binding Bosnians of all faiths together, like bosančica in former times.77 With Jukić, he has become an icon of modern Bosnian/Bosniak ideology. The difficulty is that none of the pigeonholing of these various figures quite fits. Besides the fact that Knežević's fellow Franciscans were themselves responsible for the decline of customs he praised, like the bosančica script, his Bosnianism was marked by animus against Muslims who had in his view rejected their history; he looked for liberation from Christian states.78 As for Provincial Šunjić, the best example of a cautiously Austrophile gradualist, he was also an expert in Oriental languages and admirer of Islamic educational and charitable provision, who feared that behind Austria stood centralistic Germany, with its Protestantism and atheism. As he once exclaimed, ‘Won’t Austria destroy our customs and our traditions? … We unhappy Bosnians will be first swallowed up into this soulless and monolithic civilization.’79 The piling up of ambiguities and reservations follows logically from the extremely difficult position of what Lovrenović has called the ‘European-Oriental micro-culture’ of Bosnia's Catholic Croat community.80
One issue on which Jukíc had fired general agreement was the need for education: ‘No nation can advance, either spiritually or physically, if it does not have learned teachers and priests: “if the blind lead the blind, both will fall into bondage”’—so the Holy Spirit tells us.’81 Real growth began with the Order's appeal for funding from Austria in 1852.82 By 1878 there were fifty-four Catholic schools in the two provinces, of which nine were run by the Order of Merciful Sisters, operating from Zagreb with Austrian subsidies. The Sisters’ schools were modern, using Croatian textbooks and qualified staff, teaching girls mainly, but not exclusively. The failure to develop a body of qualified lay teachers distinguished the Catholic community from the Orthodox, since instruction in Franciscan-run schools depended on the priest's availability from other duties. Where Catholic merchants attempted to found a lay-controlled commercial school in Livno, Franciscan hostility reduced it to a primary school role with irregular teaching by priests for the most part.83 However, there was a Catholic realka in Sarajevo from the mid-1860s, with Turkish, Italian, French and Austrian funding. The twenty-six young Franciscans studying philosophy and theology in Bosnian monasteries in 1877, together with the nineteen studying (p.16) in Hungary, testify to the well-organized higher education programme by which the Order maintained its hegemony among talented Bosnian Catholic youth.
It was this hegemony which Austria increasingly called in question. Tension over episcopal appointments between her and the Franciscans had arisen in the 1860s, and Bishop Vuičić's resistance to the introduction of other male Orders, combined with what Austrian observers thought his lethargy, led to the withdrawal of his Vienna subvention in 1877. Only the Trappists succeeded in establishing themselves, with a monastery near Banjaluka in 1870. Nonetheless, Catholics had made great strides. ‘The Catholic population of the Herzegovina … sweeps forward with daily-increasing strength,’ wrote a French observer; ‘the plentiful support from abroad, the help drawn from the Propaganda, have done much for the revival of this interesting group.’84 But this advance was relative. With thirty-five churches in more than a hundred parishes, compared to the 236 churches of the Orthodox, no real national consciousness and a clerical elite embroiled in the defence of its historic position, Catholics were not expected by non-Austrian observers to play a decisive part in shaping events in Bosnia. These preferred, at least in the 1860s, to stress the isolation of the Catholics, the mutual hatred of the Christian confessions and the likelihood, in the event of a rising, that Catholics would side with their Muslim masters to avoid falling from one domination to another (Serbian) that would be even more humiliating.85 The more the Habsburg monarchy interested itself in Bosnia, however, the more significant their role could potentially become.
Bosnia and the Powers
For centuries neglected by the European world, Bosnia came to attention with the opening of consulates by the six leading powers in the 1850s and 1860s. From then until 1878, diplomats, geologists and military officers, together with private citizens and tourists, greatly augmented the few, mainly French accounts of this intriguing backwater. The picture they presented was largely unflattering. While the ignorance and ingrained conservatism constantly referred to86 might be glossed with the primitive egalitarianism of an oppressed people,87 equally common was the stereotype of the sly, cowardly Oriental Christian, ‘the universal falseness, cruelty and treacherousness’ which were the moral consequence of backwardness and subjection.88 Muslims might strike some as ‘manly’ and ‘honourable’,89 but by common consent they were ‘fanatical, intolerant, arbitrary … and devoid of comprehension of modern civilization’.90 Influenced by their ethnological interests and the superciliousness of a dawning imperialist age, these European writers depicted a static society, with little reference to the new currents of thought mentioned above. ‘They are all naturally indolent and averse to progress, Christians and Muslims alike’, wrote the British consul of the Bosnians, ‘and I know not one, nor have I (p.17) ever heard of anyone among them of any particular intelligence or political capacity.’91
Bosnia's economic potential was more favourably treated. According to an Austrian civil engineer in 1878, it was a land ‘prodigally endowed with treasures of every kind, with fertile soil, cattle, wood, minerals, water power as well as unparalleled scenic attractions’.92 Prompted by the excellent fruit the British consul grew in his Sarajevo garden, the future archaeologist Arthur Evans reflected on the ‘heaven’ it could be in ‘civilized hands’, while for an Austrian commentator its ‘comprehensive’ mineral riches were ‘for the asking’.93 However, the most interesting economic literature on Bosnia came in 1878–79; it was a consequence, not cause, of the occupation. Austria's trade with Bosnia was a petty, regional concern, just as a mere 3.2 per cent of Russia's went to Turkey as a whole.94 Even Bosnia's role in Baron Hirsch's trans-Balkan railway project failed to elicit much interest in Austrian business circles, although a section of it was opened there in 1873.95 In other words, Bosnia attracted growing international interest neither for its people nor its resources. The issue was political. It was ‘the Eastern question’.
By the mid-nineteenth century, the question mark over the Turkish empire in the Balkans was linked with other international uncertainties. Polish emissaries worked in Constantinople and Belgrade. The exiled Hungarian leader of 1848–49, Louis Kossuth, drafted plans of a Danubian confederation including Serbia and Romania, while Garibaldi's schemes envisaged an east Adriatic landing to mobilize south Slavs and Magyars against the Habsburg enemy. The Eastern question thus entered a new phase. It had seemed for much of the eighteenth century that Austria would carve out the most from any Ottoman collapse, but the French revolutionary experience had turned it into a conservative force, concerned to shore up the Sultan's power. The initiative in its rivalry with Tsarist Russia passed to the latter. Yet there was a dualism in Russian policy. The ties of language and Orthodox religion which Russia shared with the majority of Balkan people could not be a matter of indifference to Russian diplomacy, but mindful of Tsarist autocratic traditions and distrustful of Slav nationalists’ loyalty, the long-serving foreign minister Gorchakov (1856–78) was more concerned to maintain Russian influence in places like Belgrade than to set an activist agenda. Once Russia had succeeded in throwing off restrictions in the Black Sea, imposed on her after the Crimean War, he was content to enter the conservative Three Emperors’ League with Germany and Austria in 1873. But Panslav sentiment exerted a far greater influence on emerging Russian ‘public opinion’, exercised through forums like the Slavic charitable societies, which channelled aid for church and school building in the Balkans, often through local Russian consuls. For the duality was present in official circles themselves, like the Balkan consular service under the energetic Count Nikolai Ignatiev, Panslav ambassador in Istanbul from 1864 to 1877. Austrian suspicions of a restless Russian propaganda in the south Slav world came to shadow Austro-Russian relations.
(p.18) In contrast, Austrian imperial circles had evolved a more specific policy towards Bosnia. It entailed positing support for Turkish integrity on the Porte's willingness to reform as well as repress; should reform ultimately fail, a paternalist relationship with Serbia offered a safeguard against the emergence of a large south Slav state under Serbian aegis. Thus Austria lent Serbia diplomatic support over the withdrawal of the Turkish population and later the Turkish garrison from Belgrade in 1862/1867. As early as 1856 military circles had suggested that Austrian Dalmatia was indefensible if the Bosnian hinterland fell into hostile hands. By 1875 the Austrian position had come to be the occupation of Bosnia. From the 1850s and establishment of a consulate in Sarajevo the Monarchy cultivated its only natural support base there through subventions to Franciscan schools and clergy. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century treaties entitled her to intercede for the rights of Ottoman Catholics, but she also made grants to some Orthodox priests in Montenegro, and Bosnians could attend the Orthodox seminary in Zadar, Dalmatia.96
Nowhere in the monarchy did the Panslav bogey loom so large as in Hungary, with its own large Slav population. The distinctive Hungarian role in Habsburg south Slav policy is apparent in the mission of Benjamin von Kállay as Austro Hungarian Consul General in Belgrade (1868–75). Deeply convinced of the importance of the south Slav question both for the Monarchy and his own nation, Kállay argued in his History of the Serbs that the Serbs traditionally had looked to Austria, only for Austrian diffidence to allow the Russians to make Serbia a mere tool in its drive to Constantinople.97 Besides thwarting Russia, Kállay's diplomatic activity had a further, specifically Magyar, angle. This was to win the Serbs for a pro-Hungarian alignment through offering support for Serbian acquisition of Bosnia; Hungaro-Serbian friendship could help offset the threat Austro-German centralists still posed to the autonomy Hungary had won in the Compromise of 1867. In the event, Prussia's victory over France in 1870–71 removed this threat and assured Kállay's full loyalty to the Habsburg Dualist state.98
One aspect of Kállay's policy was to detach Serbia from Croatia at a time when the Croats were resisting subordination to Hungary in the new Dualist structures. Croats formed the majority of the south Slavs in the Monarchy, who naturally had an interest in the fate of Bosnia. Five of the eight Habsburg consuls in Sarajevo up to 1878 were south Slavs, and they were also prominent among officers of the Military Frontier which had developed from the sixteenth century along the Habsburg–Ottoman border. Andrássy did not disguise his suspicion of this south Slav role, and in 1871 Franz Joseph finally decreed the disbandment of the Military Frontier, though its fusion with ‘civil’ Croatia was not completed till 1881, very much on Hungarian terms. The Frontier spirit remained a factor, however, though not all influential Frontiersmen were Catholic Croats. General Rodić, Governor and military commander of Dalmatia in the 1870s, for example, was Orthodox.
(p.19) Indeed, the position of some two million Croats in the Monarchy was weak compared to their historic claims. Since 1102 the medieval Croatian kingdom had come under the Hungarian Crown and the ‘Triune Kingdom’ of Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia had later been partitioned, with Dalmatia falling under Venetia and (definitively from 1814) Austria. Croatia-Slavonia was about 85 per cent peasant and 80 per cent illiterate, while the educated class in Zagreb was as fluent in German as Croatian. The ‘Illyrian’ movement for intra-Croatian and Croato-Serb linguistic unity launched by Ljudevit Gaj in the 1830s had provided a modern basis for aspirations towards the reunification of the Croatian lands, which were also inhabited by Serbs. Under the name of Yugoslavism it took a more explicitly political form in the 1860s under Bishop Strossmayer, who championed the cause of a federal Monarchy against Austro-Magyar Dualism. True to his Serbophile views, Strossmayer at times was prepared to envisage a federal Yugoslav state formed from Habsburg and Ottoman territories, and even, in 1875–78, to allow a Serbian occupation of Bosnia, historically considered by Croats a Croatian land. The Croatian claims went back to medieval precedents and overlapped with Hungarian claims, as well as arguments over medieval Bosnia's Catholicity.99 But majority opinion in Strossmayer's Croatian National Party had no intention of yielding their right to Bosnia. Both Serb and Croat contemporary historians are keener than their ideologically ‘Yugoslav’ predecessors to stress the essentially Croatian priorities of Strossmayer too.100
The Nagodba (compromise) with Hungary of 1868 allowed Croatia only limited internal self-government. The failure of Strossmayer's attempt to broaden the base of Croatian politics by alliance with the Serbs led to the rise of the Party of (historic) Right under Ante Starčević, which condemned Serbs, as well as Austrians and Hungarians, as enemies of Croatia. In circumstances of Croatian weakness this triple rejection was a quixotic position, lent piquancy by Starčević's description of the Bosnian Muslims as the ‘flower of the Croatian nation’. Since he said Bosnia should remain Turkish until a self-governing Croatia could take it over, he made himself irrelevant to the approaching crisis of Turkish rule.101 All in all, diverse Croatian attitudes to Bosnia expressed the complexities of Croatian society, in which Habsburg dynasticism and Magyar nationalism constrained options for the native Slav population. The question was whether Croatia could achieve her national ambitions in Bosnia without becoming the tool either of the Serbs or the Habsburgs. Yet Strossmayer remained an imposing figure on a wider stage. Internationally known for his speeches against papal infallibility at the Vatican Council of 1870–71, he withdrew from a direct role in Croatian party politics in 1873, only to launch vaster, if vaguer projects of Slav renaissance through Catholic–Orthodox reconciliation and a rapprochement of Russia with the Vatican.102 For a confessionally organized society like Bosnia these could have profound implications.
Equally ambitious for Bosnian, or Herzegovinian, territory were Serbia and Montenegro respectively. Tiny, impoverished Montenegro, its capital, Cetinje, (p.20) a village of 1,500 souls and a dozen consulates, punched far above its weight in European politics, aided by its influence over Herzegovinian Orthodox and the marriage ties its canny ruler, Nikola, had contrived with the Russian and Italian royal families. Serbia's situation was different, at least potentially, because of its greater capacity for modernization. Institutionally, since the 1840s it had been developing the lineaments of a bureaucracy and intelligentsia trained in foreign universities, while the 1869 Constitution provided the basis for evolution from princely autocracy to parliamentary monarchy. After the withdrawal of the Phanariots an autonomous Church hierarchy had introduced most of the institutions of the more advanced Karlowitz Serb Orthodox Patriarchate in the Monarchy.103 Seeing how Slavs occupied the lowest rung of the ladder in the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, autonomous Serbia's leaders early developed a sense of mission whereby their little state would become the nucleus for the creation of a truly independent and united Serbdom. The Belgrade government had networks of agents in Bosnia which went back to, indeed preceded,104 the secret Načertanije (Plan) of 1844: minister Garašanin's programme for the liberation of other Serb-inhabited provinces of the Turkish empire, in the first instance Bosnia, followed by that of Serbs in the Habsburg monarchy.
There is something outlandish in a subject statelet of little more than a million people, just 4.2 per cent of whom were literate in 1866, planning for the destruction of two great empires. It is easier, at first view, to understand the dismissiveness towards Serbia of Habsburg Balkanists like Kállay than their frequent paranoia about the threat it posed. Serbian nineteenth-century history was strewn with coups, assassinations and dynastic conflict. The reorganization of the Church did not penetrate the grass roots,105 nor did Serbian propaganda in Bosnia, hampered by Belgrade's concern to win Muslim support by guaranteeing beg property rights.106 Indeed, Bosnian and Herzegovinian students in the ‘second section’ of the Belgrade seminary set up to indocrinate ‘unliberated’ Serbs claimed that its harsh authoritarianism was preparing them for a life of lying and servility, as in Turkey.107 The Serb socialist pioneer, Svetozar Markoví (1848–75), denouncing the futility of Balkan revolution from above, observed tartly that Serbian statesmen simply identified ‘civilization’ with the repressive norms of western Europe: ‘and indeed, the more the Serbian state has developed the greater the internal independence of the Serbian people has declined’.108 Yet the very fact that a man like Marković could concern himself with the Serb cause at this level of sophistication showed that the rising Serbian intelligentsia was not to be sneezed at. The only way forward for the tiny, backward state's educated class was to align itself with modern European liberal ideas, which could be used to justify Serbian national goals. Gale Stokes has argued persuasively that instability at the top, as in the assassination of Prince Mihailo Obrenović in 1868, facilitated the development of a quasi-parliamentary party politics, which developed largely independent of the illiterate peasant masses. A tacit bargain (p.21) was struck whereby the educated class would not interfere with the peasants’ patriarchal ways and the peasants would not block the elite's endeavours to create a bureaucratic state apparatus, which satisfied their aspiration to modernize ‘the nation’—and provided them with jobs.109 This conjunction of educated elite and peasantry, linked theoretically by the concept of the nation, however far apart in ordinary life, provided a model by which Balkan society could be understood. It was to be influential in Bosnia, both in its positive and negative implications.
But Serbia was not the only role model for Bosnian Serbs. The Serbs of Vojvodina in southern Hungary, descendants of migrants from Turkish rule, were the wealthiest and best-educated section of Serbdom. In the Orthodox Patriarchate of Karlowitz, serving the great majority of Habsburg Serbs, they had a rich and powerful autonomous institution, whose influence was marked in the early development of the Church in autonomous Serbia.110 The Vojvodina Serbs’ relative development allowed for the rise of a commercial and professional class, organized in Svetozar Miletić's National Liberal Party of the 1860s, which like Strossmayer fought for federalism in the Habsburg Monarchy, and also challenged the dominance of the Karlowitz Orthodox hierarchy. Though they failed in the first objective, they gained a substantial role for the laity in the constitution of the Karlowitz Patriarchate approved by the Hungarian government in 1868. The Vojvodina liberals were to be an important influence on the development of Bosnia, both through the migration of teachers and other ‘cultural workers’ and the example of a liberal nationalist laity locked in conflict with a conservative Church hierarchy.
Miletić was associated with the organ Zastava, the best informed critic of Turkish rule in Bosnia, and the Ujedinjena omladina srpska or United Serb Youth, which advocated a fervent if vague pan-Serb cultural unity and criticized the Belgrade government for not linking the Serb cause more strongly with free modern political institutions. Consul General Kállay described its themes as ‘the unattainable wishes of a few hot-heads’, reflecting the discontent of those in a backward milieu who were unable to land a job in the bureaucracy—a foretaste of arguments he would deploy at the helm of Austrian policy in Bosnia.111 The nationalist atmosphere of this time of claim and contestation made everyone cynical about others’ pretensions. Zastava's view of Croat aspirations was that Strossmayer's Yugoslavism was a cloak for German penetration, Franciscans should be rebuked for teaching their flock to reject the Serb name in favour of the ‘topographical’ term Croat and, while Serbs extended a friendly hand to the Croats, they could just as well do without them!112 For small nations the stakes in the acquisition of such a prize as Bosnia were high. But without assistance from the Great Powers, they could not achieve their goals. The Bosnian rising of 1875 opened the final act, in which all these interrelationships were brought to resolution.
(p.22) Balkan Crisis, 1875–78
In the event, the outcome confirmed the themes prefigured here. Serbia was too weak, pursued a dubious strategy in Bosnia and did not receive full-hearted support from Russia. Russian prioritization of Bulgaria helped Austria to safeguard her interests in the west Balkans, in which she received the support of most Croats. Bosnians themselves were not united enough to influence events. Thus Andrássy was able to implement the policy he had outlined in early 1875, that if full Turkish integrity was unsustainable, Bosnia should be Austria's. This was a policy of the Monarchy's governing circles, strongly opposed by parliamentary liberals concerned for the likely resulting charges on the public purse.
The rising was not the work of Serbian agents, but essentially a peasant revolt, prompted by tithe grievances. Soon, though, merchants linked to insurrectionary plans assumed a role. But the rising failed militarily because of disunity, both between Serbia and Montenegro and between peasant aspirations and nationalists’ attempts to win Muslim support. The Bosnian Serb historian Milorad Ekmečí comments sarcastically that it was a unique historical moment when nobles were canvassed to join a peasant revolt.113 Serbia's intervention by declaring war on Turkey led to her swift defeat. Russia followed in 1877 but her campaign targeted Istanbul and the east Balkans rather than Serbia and Bosnia. This made it easier for her to offer Vienna the prospect of an Austrian occupation of Bosnia in the Budapest Convention (January 1877), thereby winning Habsburg neutrality and clearing her way to war. At Austria-Hungary's wish, the Convention ruled out the creation of a large south state, but Russia may have thought this was directed against a Greater Serbia, not the Greater Bulgaria eventually created by the Russo-Turkish Treaty of San Stefano in March 1878. In fact, not only Austria but also Britain objected to San Stefano and succeeded in rolling it back. Austria was also able to wean away Croat support from the Bosnian insurgents: fra Grgo Martić organized a petition against their declaration in favour of annexation to Serbia. While Strossmayer and his leading collaborator Canon Franjo Rački opposed an Austrian occupation, the majority of Croat politicians welcomed it, somewhat naively thinking it would result in a Bosnia devolved to themselves.
Since Serbia recognized her impotence, this left the Bosnian Serbs and Muslims as those most directly opposed to the threatening Habsburg occupation. As their military options ran out, Serb insurgent leaders formed a provisional government in September 1877 and called for ‘complete freedom and self-government’ for the ‘Bosnian people’, while reserving their wish for union with other Serbian lands.114 But this was a solution with little inner strength because the ‘people’ it posited did not exist as a cohesive force. Muslim peasants had responded to the rising by streaming to the towns and often joining counter-insurrectionary forces which had led some 200,000 Christians to flee to Austria. When the Congress of Berlin (p.23) conferred a mandate for occupation on Austria in July 1878, Muslims in turn became insurrectionaries. Defying the Sultan's orders (though in one view not his wishes), they mustered a substantial resistance, which held up 170,000 Habsburg troops for three months, with significant Serb support in the towns but not in the countryside. Religious figures, most notably the mufti of Plevlje and the hodža Hadži Lojo, were prominent in the resistance, which had enthusiastic support from the Muslim masses, with more equivocation among elite figures.115 While important Serb leaders remained loyal to their ideology of Serb-Muslim cooperation, a contemporary also observed some fear of its Muslim neighbours in the Serb urban minority.116 There seems justification for the view that Muslim resistance to Austria in summer 1878 reflected a ‘Bosniak ethno-national selfconsciousness’ which has been unduly neglected, but hardly for the claim that behind it stood ‘the whole nation of Bosnia’ asserting the continuity of Bosnian state tradition.117 It was the lack of overall unity among south Slavs and in Bosnia which had smoothed Austria's course.
The incoming Austrian commander, according to one account, rounded on the Bosnians as mere rebels whom he would show the might of Austria.118 But the matter was not so simple. The crisis of 1875–78, in the view of Serb patriots and many later Serb historians, was to have provided the consummation whereby the social wrongs of a misruled people were to be fused into a national movement uniting Serbdom and its lands.119 It was the turning point which failed to turn and the disenchantment bore bitter fruit. Yet already in 1834 the Austrian information service had reported it as axiomatic for Bosnian begs that the raya should not become free peasants, nor Bosnia be made into a Serbia.120 The crisis was traumatic for Muslims too. Finally, the crisis had directly engaged Croatian opinion, and occupation by a Catholic power gave spokesmen of the Bosnian Catholic minority a new significance in their own and others’ eyes. Austria-Hungary had taken on more than the cowering Balkanites General Phillipovich saw before him.
Thus this introductory survey has confirmed the aptness of Karl Sax's 1864 observation, that the people of Bosnia were, in national terms, ethnically uniform and politically divided. Both aspects of this paradox must be given full weight. The sense of cultural affinity, reflecting language, folk tradition and widely overlapping lifestyle, was a powerful reality in Bosnia, but in its linguistic aspect it could transcend the distinctive Bosnian milieu. When fra Anton Kneževí visited the Hungarian Serb leader Svetozar Miletić, Miletić, taking him for a Muslim, addressed him as ‘Brother Bosniak’.121 Miletić's greeting was to a fellow south Slav. The importance of the Herderian view of nationhood prevalent in the nineteenth century, which identified it with language, can hardly be exaggerated. It inclined intellectuals, who naturally saw mother-tongue literacy as the key to their ‘enlightening’ goals, towards acceptance of a common south Slav identity, any notion of religiously defined ethnicities being felt to savour of the past. Yet since the term ‘Illyrian’ to denote this encompassing nationality did not catch on, a tendency developed for different south Slav peoples to express the (p.24) common cultural identity through their own name. This applied particularly to Bosnia. Miletić called his assumed Muslim visitor ‘brother’ because of his ideological position that Bosnian Muslims were Serbs. Similarly, the leading Croatian expert on Bosnia, while acknowledging the different communities, saw them all as one nation ethnically, namely Croat.122 Though remaining outside European debates about nationhood, Bosnian Muslims undoubtedly held Bosnia to be their patrimony. The paradox was that separate communities could and did project cultural affinities into their own perspectives. But these perspectives had different points of reference, the Muslim in notions of the Bosniaks as defenders of Islam, the Serb and Croat in terms of medieval state traditions.
It may be said that these ideological positions were held consciously by very few, particularly in the Christian communities. However, the foundations had been set and the tendency through the nineteenth century was for them to define themselves against each other more clearly. Thus the Cyrillic script, at least in its Bosnian form, had a traditional presence in all three groups, reflected in the choice of Cyrillic for Osman Pasha's official journal, Bosanski vjestnik. But despite their bosančica past the Franciscans boycotted Bosanski vjestnik because of its script. Of the subscribers to Srpsko-dalmatinski magazin (The Serb-Dalmatian Magazine), 99.2 per cent were Orthodox Serbs.123 Intellectual initiatives developed on independent confessional lines, as if without question. The only exceptions appear to have been Ivan Franjo Jukić's proposal for a common fund for Christian schools, which the Orthodox Metropolitan ignored, and the Đakovo Franciscan students’ calendar for 1871.124
In the lead-up to occupation the lack of a Bosnian consensus no doubt aided the Habsburg monarchy. In governing Bosnia, however, the fissures history had dug in this beautiful land faced her with difficult conundrums. Cultural mission was a plausible theme in view of the shortcomings this chapter has described, but it bore misleading implications of a tabula rasa. Bosnia had arguably had too much history, rather than too little. Moreover, owing to international and domestic reservations, the Monarchy had only occupied Bosnia, not annexed it. This book will deal with the internal aspects of the Monarchy's cultural task, the overhauling of the creaking religious and educational structures, and the attendant mentalities, which contemporaries saw as central to successful adaptation to modern European civilization. Yet enough has been said to indicate how such problems could have an international aspect, embedded in the complex hierarchies of multinational religious organizations. And how diverse the mentalities could be with which Austria had to grapple in the south Slav world, even among reformers, needs final emphasis. The chronicle of events in Bosnia from 1825 to 1856 written by the remarkable champion of Sarajevo Serb girls’ education, Staka Skenderova, frequently broke into the ten-syllable lines of Serbian heroic poetry. It was, she said, easier to remember.125 Yet nearly contemporary was Vaso Pelagić, who became a socialist. When to this is added the Paris-trained Muslim portrait-painter, Mustafa Juzbašić,126 the world of Muslim (p.25) ulema who eschewed print and held that the earth was flat, and the various shades of Catholic opinion, it becomes clearer still that shaping this inheritance would be no light matter. The greatest problem was that a limited number of Bosnians had imbibed the Enlightenment view of progress, linked in their minds with notions of the people or nation. There were therefore expectations which might be difficult for a ‘conservative, non-Slav state’ to satisfy.127
(1) Memorandum printed in fra B. Gavranović, Uspostava redovite katoličke hijerarhije u Bosni i Hercegovini 1881. godine (Belgrade, 1935), 280–7 (283).
(3) A. Çirakman, From the ‘Terror of the World’ to the ‘Sick Man of Europe’. European Images of Ottoman Empire and Society from the Sixteenth Century to the Nineteenth (New York, 2002), 213–17.
(4) J. Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l’empire ottoman depuis ses origines jusqu’à nos jours, 3 vols (Paris, 1840–2), iii. 637.
(5) T. Kontje, German Orientalisms (Ann Arbor, 2004), 118–32 (122).
(6) S. Mangold, Eine ‘weltbürgerliche Wissenschaft’—Die deutsche Orientalistik im 19. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 2004), 113.
(7) G. Muir Mackenzie and A. P. Irby, Travels in the Slavonic Provinces of Turkey-inEurope, 2 vols, 5th edn (London, 1877), i. 1. The chapter concerned was written (p.260) after Mackenzie’s death; A. A. Paton, Servia, the youngest member of the European Family (London, 1845), 96.
(8) F. Kanitz, Serbien. Historisch-etnographische Reisestudien aus den Jahren 1859–1868 (Leipzig, 1868), v.
(9) S. Ćerić, Muslimani srpsko-hrvatskog jezika (Sarajevo, 1968), 150. Of the 2,718 mixed villages, 653 were inhabited by members of all three confessions.
(10) K. Sax, Skizzen über die Bewohner Bosniens (Separatabdruck aus den Mitteilungen der k. Geographischen Gesellschaft, 7. Jahrgang) (Vienna, 1864), 5.
(11) For this paragraph, see S. Ćirković, Istorija srednjovekovne bosanske države (Belgrade, 1963); B. Nilević, ‘Proces afirmacije srednjovjekovne bosanske države’, in Bosna i Hercegovina od najstarijih vremena do kraja Drugog svjetskog rata (Sarajevo, 1998), 57–79.
(12) For lucid presentations, see J. V. Fine Jr, The Bosnian Church. A New Interpretation (Boulder, Colorado, 1975: non-dualist); J. Šidak, Studije o ‘Crkvi bosanskoj’ i bogomilstvu (Zagreb, 1975: moving towards dualist).
(13) S. M. Džaja, Konfession und Nationalität Bosniens und der Herzegovina. Voremanzipatorische Phase 1463–1804 (Munich, 1984), 23–39. For a Bosniak critique, see S. Jalimam. ‘Strah od historije’, Godišnjak BZK Preporod, 1 (2001): 263–72. Jalimam’s own Historija bosanskih bogomila (Tuzla, 1999) sees the Bosnian Church as Bogomil and a stronghold of Bosnian patriotism.
(14) Z. Behija, ‘Osmanski izvori objavljeni u periodu 1990-ih godina’, in Naučni skup, Istorijska nauka u Bosni i Hercegovini u razdoblju 1990–2000, ed. E. Redžić (Sarajevo, 2003), 155–60.
(15) For a swelling literature, see, for example, H. Šabanović, Književnost Muslimana na orijentalnim jezicima (Sarajevo, 1973), and the symposium in Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju 39 (1989).
(16) See Z. Behija, Zlatno doba Sarajeva (XVI stoljece) (Sarajevo, 1996).
(17) Calculated from S. Balić, Kultura Bošnjaka. Muslimanska komponenta (Vienna, 1973), 65–119; ibid., Das unbekannte Bosnien. Europas Brücke zur islamischen Welt (Cologne, 1992), 271–88 (alhamijado).
(18) E. Pelidija, Banjalučki boj iz 1737 (Sarajevo, 2003), partic. 351.
(19) For Bosnian Muslim distinctiveness: A. Sućeska, ‘Specifičnosti državno-pravnog položaja Bosne pod Turcima’, Godišnjak Pravnog fakulteta u Sarajevu, 9 (1961): 269–92, and 10 (1962): 317–61; for some qualification, see M. Moačanin, ‘Defterology and Mythology. Ottoman Bosnia up to the Tanzimat’, in M. Koller and K.H. Karpat (eds), Ottoman Bosnia. History in the Present (Madison, 2004), 189–97. For insecurity: M. Koller, Bosnien an der Schwelle der Neuzeit. Eine Kulturgeschichte der Gewalt, 1747–1798 (Munich, 2004), 198.
(20) M. Imamović, Historija Bošnjaka (Sarajevo, 1998), 338. Ahmed Aličić in his Pokret za autonomiju Bosne od 1831. do 1832. godine (Sarajevo, 1996), 51–60, attacks the distinction between free and dependent peasants as alien to Ottoman legislation, but it is generally accepted that in the later Ottoman empire patterns of dominance and dependency had come to overlap substantially with religious divides: N. Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (London, 1994), 48.
(21) Aličić, Pokret, 18, 370–1.
(23) Figures vary: see H. Ćurić, Muslimensko Školstvo u Bosni i Hercegovini 1800–1918 (Sarajevo, 1983), 45, for mektebs; the madrassa figure is reckoned from specific references in I. Kasumović, Školstvo i obrazovanje u Bosanskom ejaletu za vrijeme osmanske uprave (Mostar, 1999), 157–249.
(24) J. Džambo, Buchwesen in Bosnien und der Herzegowina (1800–1878). Zum Problem der Lesersoziologie (Frankfurt am Main, 1985), 43. Significantly, boys outnumbered girls by three to one among Muslims and Catholics and five to one among Serbs.
(25) Kasumovíc, Školstvo, 93–4.
(28) F. Šišić (ed.), Bosna i Hercegovina za vrijeme vezirovanja Omer paše Lataše 1850–1852 (Belgrade, 1938), 421.
(29) J. Koetschet, Osman Pascha, der letzte grosse Vesier Bosniens, und seine Nachfolger (Sarajevo, 1909), 1–36.
(30) PRO, FO 78/2296: Holmes to Granville, 5 September 1873; 78/2402, Holmes to Derby, 3 December 1875; 78/2296, Holmes to Granville, 23 October 1873.
(31) French text of the rescript in PRO, FO 78/2340: Holmes to Derby, 3 April 1874.
(32) Examples in Zastava o Bosni i Hercegovini, ed. H. Kapidžić, 4 vols (Sarajevo, 1954), i, articles of 1/13 and 5/17 May 1866; V. Bogičević, Istorija razvitka osnovnih škola u Bosni i Hercegovini od početka do 1918 (Sarajevo, 1965), 56, 58.
(33) Izvještaji italijanskog konzulata u Sarajevu (1863–1870 godine), ed. P. Mitrović and H. Kreševljaković (Sarajevo, 1958), 126: Duranda al Ministero, 8 March 1867;PRO, FO 78/2035: Holmes to Stanley, 1 June 1868.
(34) PRO, FO 78/2402: Holmes to Derby, 30 December 1875.
(35) For bosančica, see Hrvatska enciclopedija (Zagreb, 2000), i. 246–7. Serbs have traditionally identified bosančica wholly with Cyrillic, denying it separate status as a territorial script, cf. Ćirković, Istorija srednjovekovne bosanske države, 235.
(36) E. Zgodić, Bošnjačko iskustvo politike. Osmansko doba (Sarajevo, 1998), 379.
(37) M. Hadžijahić, Od tradicije do identiteta. Geneza nacionalnog pitanja bosanskih Muslimana (Sarajevo, 1974), 164–5.
(38) Malcolm, Bosnia, 95.
(39) Izvještaji italijanskog konzulata, 124; Duranda al ministero; PRO, FO 78/2137, Holmes to Granville, 17 February 1870; 11 March 1870.
(40) M. Ekmečić, Ustanak u Bosni 1875–1878 (Sarajevo, 1960), 11. Ekmečić plausibly suspects these census figures exaggerate the number of free peasants.
(41) For this figure: I. Hadžibegović, Postanak radničke klase u Bosni i Hercegovini i njen razvoj do 1914. godine (Sarajevo, 1980), 40. These were the begs and agas, terms which by this time roughly denoted great landlords and gentry respectively. For the title ‘beg’: H. Kamberović, Begovski zemljišni posjed u Bosni i Hercegovini od 1878 do 1918 (2nd edn, Sarajevo, 2005), 39–108.
(42) fra B. Gavranović (ed.), Bosna i Hercegovina od 1853 do 1870 godine (Sarajevo, 1956), 132.
(43) The above paragraph is based mainly on V. Popović, Agrarno pitanje u Bosni i turski neredi za vreme reformnog režima Abdul Medžida (Belgrade, 1949); A. Aličić, ‘Prilog proučavanju položaja sela i grada u Bosni u XIX vijeku’, JI Č (1974), no. 1–2, 79–91, and M. Ekmečić, ‘Srpski narod u Turskoj od sredine XIX, veka do 1878’, in Istorija Srpskog naroda, 6 vols (Belgrade 1981–93), vol. 5, Od Prvog srpskog ustanka do Berlinskog kongresa 1804–1878, pt. 1, ed. V. Stojančević, 449–526 (460–70).
(44) Bosnian Orthodox bishops took the title ‘metropolitan’, the distinction between bishops and metropolitans having been largely erased in the Eastern Church: I Silbernagl, Verfassung und gegenwärtiger Bestand sämmtlicher Kirchen des Orients (Regensburg, 1865), 23.
(45) Zastava o Bosni, iii. 3, 37, 9.
(46) ABiH, ZMF, BH 7439/1882, Provincial Government (PG) to Joint Finance Ministry (JMF), 23 August 1882.
(47) Jukić, Ivan Franjo, Putopisi i istorisko-etnografski radovi (Sarajevo, 1953), 345.
(48) H. Kreševljaković, Esnafi i obrti u Bosni i Hercegovini (Sarajevo, 1961), 22.
(49) G. Thoemmel, Geschichtliche, politische und topographische Beschreibung des Vilayet Bosnien (Vienna, 1867), 170.
(50) For large acquisitions by Serbs, see Zastava o Bosni, ii. 135, iii. 34 (Jovo Babić, Gradiška); iv. 260 (Petro Petrović, Sarajevo, later a prominent supporter of the Austrian regime).
(51) N. Milaš, Pravoslavno-crkveno pravo po izvorima i posebnim zakonskim naredbama koje važe u pojedinim autokefalnim crkvama, 2nd edn (Mostar, 1902), 238, 375–85, 547–8.
(52) V. Skarić, Srpski pravoslavni narod i crkva u Sarajevu u XVII i XVIII vijeku (Sarajevo, 1928), 107.
(53) ABiH, ZMF, BH 4906/1879: PG to JMF, 31 August 1879.
(54) Zastava o Bosni, ii. 198: 25 April/7 May 1873.
(55) Minutes of the Sarajevo communal committee, meeting of 23 December 1884/4 January 1885. I was permitted to see only a summary of the minutes, covering the period 1884 to 1893.
(56) H. F. Schmid, ‘Konfessionen und Nationalitäten in Südost-Europa’, Österreichische Osthefte, 5 (1963): 92–108 (96).
(57) PRO, FO 78/1872, Holmes to Russell, 2 March 1865.
(58) PRO, FO 78/2296, Holmes to Granville, 4 April 1873; Zastava o Bosni, ii. 191–5.
(59) Zastava o Bosni, i. 283; ii. 200; iii. 33–4 and passim; V. J. Vučković (ed.), Politička akcija Srbije u južnoslovenskim pokrajinama Habsburške monarhije 1859–74 (Belgrade, 1965), 2 (Garašanin); A. von Hilferding, Bosnien. Reise-Skizzen aus dem Jahre 1857 (Bautzen, 1857), 15–17.
(60) Zastava o Bosni, iii. 238–39, 15/27 October 1875. Russian consuls also noted increased patriotism of Bosnian Serb merchants: I. Tepić (ed.), Bosna i Hercegovina u ruskim izvorima 1856–78 (Sarajevo, 1988), 203–4.
(61) I. F. Jukić, Sabrana djela, 3 vols (Sarajevo, 1973), i. 86. From 1842.
(62) M. Hadžijahić, ‘Formiranje nacionalnih ideologija u Bosni i Hercegovini u XIX vijeku’, JI Č, 1–2 (1970): 55–70 (58). For the Balkan background: E. Turczynski, Konfession und Nation. Zur Frühgeschichte d. serb. u. rumän. Nationswerdung (Düsseldorf, 1979).
(63) V. Skaríc, Sarajevo i njegova okolina od najstarijih vremena do austrougarske okupacije (Sarajevo, 1931), 223.
(64) V. Bogičević, Razvitak osnovnih škola, 19–66, is a convenient factual survey. For the realka, see T. Kruševac, ‘Srpska realka-gimnazija u Sarajevu’, Glasnik ADA, 3 (1963): 91–124. On Serb schools I also used the twenty-nine notebooks on Bosnian Serb schools compiled from press and periodical references and private correspondence by the Serb schoolteacher Risto Šušljić between 1930 and 1945. Formerly in the Bosnian National Library (NUB), these no longer exist there.
(65) Calculated from NUB, Šušljić Mss, R-390/17.
(66) ABiH, ZMF, BH 139/1881: PG to JMF, 20 December 1880.
(67) D. Ilić, Vasa Pelagić (Belgrade, 1964), 17.
(69) S. Ljubibratić, ‘Arhiepiskop i mitropolit Sava Kosanović’, Spomenica povodom osamdesetogodišnjice okupacije Bosne (1878–1958) (Belgrade, 1959), 76–82.
(70) PRO, FO 78/2402: Holmes to Derby, 30 December 1875.
(71) The rights and wrongs remain disputed. See Džaja, Konfession und Nationalität, 208–12 (Catholic), and B. Nilević, Srpska pravoslavna crkva u Bosni i Hercegovini do obnove Pećke patrijaršije (Sarajevo, 1990), 208 (Orthodox).
(72) Based on BiH, ZMF, BH 4128/1881, PG to JMF, 22 May 1881; P. Vrankić, Religion und Politik in Bosnien und der Herzegowina (1878–1918) (Paderborn, 1998), 321–89.
(73) Hilferding, Reise-Skizzen, 56.
(74) Izvještaji italijanskog konzulata, 121: Duranda’s report of 24 January 1867; PRO, FO 78/1291: Zohrab to C. Alison, Chargé d’Affaires, 1 September 1858.
(75) Vrankić, Religion und Politik, 364. Vrankić reflects the Bosnian secular clergy’s critical stance to the Franciscans.
(76) For Martić, see the introduction to I. Kecmanović, Fra Grgo Martić, Izabrani spisi (Sarajevo, 1954).
(77) S. A. Kovačić, ’Život i spisateljska djelatnost fra Antona Kneževića’, Dobri pastir, 26 (1976): 139–80.
(78) S. A. Kovačić, ‘Od Đakova do Beograda (Rukopis fra Antona Kneževića’)’, Glasnik ADA, 18/19 (1978–79): 365–84 (366). Vrankić claims that the Franciscans undermined the non-Latin script tradition in Bosnia: Religion und Politik, 348–50.
(79) I. Lovrenović, Bosanski Hrvati. Esej o agoniji jedne evropsko-orijentalne mikrokulture (Sarajevo, 1998), 30.
(81) Jukić, Putopisi, 215.
(82) This paragraph is largely based on M. Papić, Hrvatsko školstvo u Bosni i Hercegovini do 1918. godine (Sarajevo, 1982), and Vrankić, Religion und Politik, 377–89.
(83) S. Marković, Hrvatska katolička škola i učitelji u Livnu za turske uprave (Mostar, 1923).
(84) E. Pricot de Sainte Marie, L’Herzégovine (Paris, 1875), 68.
(85) Izvještaji italijankog konzulata, 51: Duranda to Venosta, 28 November 1863; PRO, FO 78/1978, Holmes to Stanley, 22 January 1867; 78/2035, Holmes to Clarendon, 12 October 1868.
(86) For example: ‘Ignorant and benighted Catholics’:Mackenzie and Irby, Travels, i, 17; ‘crude and mostly ignorant’ Muslims: J. Roskiewicz, Studien über Bosnien und Herzegovina (Leipzig, 1868), 267; ‘incredibly ignorant’ Serb priests:Hilferding, Reise-Skizzen. 16.
(87) A. J. Evans, Through Bosnia and the Herzegovina on Foot during the Insurrection (London, 1876), 309–10.
(88) Sax, Skizzen, 7.
(89) Thoemmel, Beschreibung des Vilayet Bosnien, 110.
(90) R. Poitier des Échelles, Die Productions-Verhältnisse Bosniens und der Herzegowina (Vienna, 1879), 20.
(91) PRO, FO 78/1978: Holmes to Stanley, 15 February 1867.
(92) J. Andreas Knobloch, Die Annexion von Bosnien vom Volks-und landwirtschaftlichen Standpunkt (Vienna, 1878), 18.
(93) Evans, Through Bosnia and Herzegovina, 250; Poitier des Échelles, ProduktionsVerhältnisse, 32.
(94) Roskiewicz, Studien, 311–15; B. Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, 1870–80 (Oxford, 1937), 16.
(95) C. Büchelen, Bosnien und seine volkswirtschaftliche Bedeutung für Österreich-Ungarn auf Grund von Tatsachen dargestellt (Vienna, 1879), 9–13.
(96) M. Ekmečić, ‘Mit o revoluciji i austrijska politika prema Bosni i Hercegovini i Crnoj Gori za vrijeme krimskog rata 1853–56 godine’, Godišnjak ID, 13 (1962): 119; H. Schwanda, ‘Der Protektorat Österreich-Ungarns über die Katholiken Albaniens’, Ph.D. thesis (Vienna, 1965), 1–18.
(97) B. von Kállay, Geschichte der Serben, trans. J. H. Schwicker (Budapest, 1878), v, 60–1, 263–4.
(98) A. Radenić, Dnevnik Benjamina Kalaja 1868–75 (Belgrade, 1976), vii–xxxiv.
(99) See Petrinjensis (Fran Milobar), Bosnien und das kroatische Staatsrecht: eine historischjuridische Studie (Zagreb, 1898), partic. 254–61.
(100) V. Krestić, ‘Jugoslovenska politika Josipa Jurja Štrossmajera’, in ibid. , Srpsko-hrvatski odnosi i jugoslovenska ideja 1860–1873 (Belgrade, 1983), 119–52; I. Padovan (ed.), Zbornik radova o Josipu Jurju Strossmayeru (Zagreb, 1997), esp. A. and J. Pečarić, ‘Strossmayer i Srbi’, 81–96.
(102) R.F.C. Okey, ‘The Slavonic Liturgy in Austro-Hungarian Diplomacy, 1881–1914’, The Slavonic and East European Review, 70 (1992): 258–83.
(103) See J. Mousset, La Serbie et son Église, 1830–1904 (Paris, 1938), 227–9.
(104) ‘Da li je bilo političkeakcijeSrbije u Bosni zaoslobo đenje od turske vlasti pre Garašainovog “Načertanija”?’, V. Stojančević, Iz istorije Srba u Bosni i Hercegovini (Belgrade, 2002), 74–91.
(105) R. Radić, ‘Uticaj razvoja srpsko-pravoslavne crkve na modernizacijskim procesima u Srbiji i Jugoslaviji’, in L. Perović et al. (eds), Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka (Belgrade, 1994), 235–45 (243).
(106) M. Ekmečić, ‘Nacionalna politika Srbije prema Bosni i Hercegovini i agrarno pitanje 1844–1875’, Godišnjak ID, 10 (1959): 197–219, partic. 207–13.
(107) V. Vojvodíc, U duhu Garašaininovih ideja. Srbija i neoslobo đeno Srpstvo 1868–1876 (Belgrade, 1994), 153–77.
(108) S. Marković, Srbija na Istoku (Belgrade, 1946), 138, 156. First published in book form in 1872.
(109) G. Stokes, Politics or Development. The Emergence of Political Parties in NineteenthCentury Serbia (Durham and London, 1990), partic. 291–306.
(110) For the history of the Karlowitz Patriarchate, see D. J. Popović, Srbi u Vojvodini, 3 vols (Novi Sad, 1957–63).
(111) HStA, PA, XXXVIII 187: Kállay to Andrássy, 6 July 1870.
(112) Zastava o Bosni, i. 56–8 (1866).
(113) In Ekmečić, ‘Srpski narod u Turskoj’, in Istorija Srpskog naroda, 6 vols (Belgrade 1981–93), vol. 5, pt. 1, 518.
(114) Ekmečić, Ustanak, 323.
(115) Naučni skup. Otpor austrougarskoj okupaciji 1878. godine u Bosni i Hercegovini, ed. M. Ekmečić (Sarajevo, 1979). For the Sultan, see the contribution of K. H. Karpat, ‘The Ottoman Attitude towards the Resistance of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Austrian Occupation in 1878’, ibid., 147–72.
(116) J. Koetschet, Aus Bosniens letzter Türkenzeit (Sarajevo, 1905), 94–6.
(117) Zgodić, Bošnjačko iskustvo, 410.
(118) Iz memoara protopop Nedeljka (n. pl; n. d.), 10. For Nedeljko’s memoirs, believed to have been by the radical nationalist Bosnian Serb priest Stevo Trifković and published c. 1900 in Novi Sad, see Vrankić, Religion und Politik, 100.
(119) Stojančević, ‘Vasa Pelagićotrećoj ili Srpskoj saveznoj revoluciji’, Iz istorije Srba uBosni, 139–43; M. Ekmečić, ‘Istorijski značaj ustanka u Bosni i Hercegovini 1875–1878, in ibid., Radovi iz istorije Bosne i Hercegovine XIX veka (Belgrade, 1997), 203–55.
(120) Stojančević, ‘Vasa Pelagić’, 141.
(121) Kovačić, ‘Od Đakova do Beograda’, 371.
(122) V. Klaić, Bosna. Podatci o zemljopisu i poviesti Bosne i Hercegovine. Prvi dio: zemljopis (Zagreb, 1878), 71–2.
(123) For these points, see Džambo, Buchwesen, 90–9.
(124) Vrankić, Religion und Politik, 379; Džambo, Buchwesen, 74–5.
(126) Lj. Mladenović, Gra đansko slikarstvo u Bosni i Hercegovini u XIX veku (Sarajevo, 1982), 21.
(127) Gavranović, Uspostava, 285: Andrássy’s memorandum of 21 April 1878.