Sometimes labelled ‘proximate cause’ or ‘legal cause’, remoteness concerns the scope of responsibility for wrongdoing. The dominant approach is to apply a test of reasonable foreseeability to determine whether a loss is too remote. This chapter examines the inadequacies of this test both as an inclusionary and exclusionary rule, and the failure of the logic of the Wagon Mound (No 1) from which it is derived. When loss is coincidental to a wrong, and when it is outside of the scope of the purpose of the right relied upon, are also illustrated. When the chain of causation is broken by intervening conduct of third parties and the claimant himself is shown.
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