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The Measure of Mind$
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Robert J. Matthews

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199211258

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211258.001.0001

The Received View

Chapter:
(p. 19 ) 2 The Received View
Source:
The Measure of Mind
Author(s):

Robert J. Matthews (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211258.003.0002

This chapter begins with a discussion of the eight basic tenets of the Received View, which taken together firstly present reductive metaphysical claims about the nature of propositional attitudes, cognitive capacities, and cognition itself; and secondly a normative epistemological claim about the proper form of cognitive psychological explanations. What is distinctive and essential to the Received View, and serves to distinguish it from superficially similar views about how cognition is to be understood and explained, is the representational-computational construal of propositional attitudes and their role in cognition presented in tenets (v)-(vii) of the view. The three important entailments of the received view and the historical origins and development of the Received View are considered.

Keywords:   cognition, propositional attitudes, cognitive psychology, representational-computational construal

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