The Received View
This chapter begins with a discussion of the eight basic tenets of the Received View, which taken together firstly present reductive metaphysical claims about the nature of propositional attitudes, cognitive capacities, and cognition itself; and secondly a normative epistemological claim about the proper form of cognitive psychological explanations. What is distinctive and essential to the Received View, and serves to distinguish it from superficially similar views about how cognition is to be understood and explained, is the representational-computational construal of propositional attitudes and their role in cognition presented in tenets (v)-(vii) of the view. The three important entailments of the received view and the historical origins and development of the Received View are considered.
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