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A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation
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A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation

Debraj Ray

Abstract

The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list of examples of this phenomenon is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. This book looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions will form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a social perspective? The book brings together developments in both cooperative and non-cooperative ... More

Keywords: agreements, bargaining, blocking, cooperative games, coalitions, coalition formation, coalition structure, efficiency, farsightedness, partition functions

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2007 Print ISBN-13: 9780199207954
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2008 DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207954.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Debraj Ray, author
Julius Silver Professor of Economics, New York University
Author Webpage