Responsibility for Harm
This chapter discusses the following issues: should results matter to the deserved measure of punishment and, if so, why? If they do matter, are there limits on liability to punishment for results and, if so, where is the line to be drawn? At results caused intentionally? At results caused with foresight of their likelihood? At results caused negligently? When does a cause intervening between the defendant's culpable conduct and the proscribed result shield the defendant from criminal liability for that result? The chapter argues that answers to these questions cannot be derived from the formal agency paradigm and so require transition to a new framework, one ordered to promoting the conditions for realizing the agent's potential for autonomous action. It shows that the new paradigm (of real autonomy) is already implied in the formalist one and that it generates normative limits on the extent to which luck can determine the rightful measure of punishment.
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.