This chapter criticizes the character and choice theories of the culpable mind as incapable of justifying judicial punishment specifically as opposed to moral censure generally. It develops from legal retributivism an account of the culpable mind requirement that reconciles judicial punishment with the inviolability of the person. The chapter argues that the wrongdoer's choice to interfere or to risk interfering with another agent's capacity to act on ends it chooses is the level of fault required to make punishment implicitly self-imposed by the recipient and thus distinguishable from the wrongdoer's violence. Such a choice is one to which a denial of rights of agency may be logically imputed, a denial by which the wrongdoer implicitly authorizes his own coercibility. Exculpatory conditions are those which block an inference from the agent's choice to a denial of rights. The chapter argues that this version of subjectivism is invulnerable against the criticisms levelled against other versions.
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