Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Believing by FaithAn Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

John Bishop

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199205547

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205547.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 20 November 2018

A Moral Preference for Modest Fideism?

A Moral Preference for Modest Fideism?

Chapter:
(p.208) 9 A Moral Preference for Modest Fideism?
Source:
Believing by Faith
Author(s):

John Bishop (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205547.003.0009

This concluding chapter reviews the case for a supra-evidential, moral coherentist, fideism: it is argued that adequate criteria have been supplied for distinguishing good from bad faith-ventures. Although neither fideists nor evidentialists can show their opponents to be epistemically irresponsible, fideism might yet be preferred directly on moral grounds. Some moral considerations in favour of fideism are canvassed, including the suggestions that evidentialists lack self-acceptance; that they are too dogmatically attached to naturalisml; and even that they fail to be sufficiently loving! It is further argued that an evidentialist prohibition on those religious faith-ventures that affirm the world to be a moral order, in which the pursuit of the good is not ultimately pointless will sit uncomfortably with a moral epistemology under which basic moral truth-claims can be accepted only through passionally motivated doxastic venture.

Keywords:   evidentialism, fideism, love, moral epistemology, naturalism, self-acceptance

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .