The Quality of Corporate Law and its Limits
This chapter demonstrates why the data indicates that the quality-of-corporate-law argument, although it explains transition economies nicely, is over-stated for several of the world's richest nations. In too many of them, even with good shareholder protection, stock can be sold, but ownership does not separate from control. Based on the data, several nations have good corporate law, but not much diffusion and separation. These nations also have a high potential for managerial agency costs: relatively weaker product market competition and relatively stronger political pressures on managers to disfavour shareholders.
Keywords: shareholder protection, corporate law argument, transition economies, managerial agency costs
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