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Truth and Ontology$
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Trenton Merricks

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199205233

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205233.001.0001

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(p.98) 5 Modality
Truth and Ontology

Trenton Merricks (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter argues that neither the modal realism of David Lewis nor abstract possible worlds reductionism can satisfy Truthmaker or TSB when it comes to truths of de re modality. On the contrary, both Truthmaker and TSB lead straight to irreducible modal properties. Thus, Truthmaker and TSB have significant implications for the nature of modality and the inventory of irreducible properties.

Keywords:   abstract possible worlds, David Lewis, de re modality, irreducible properties, modal properties, modal realism

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