A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights
George Letsas
Abstract
This book provides a philosophical study of the methods of interpretation used by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. By drawing on Anglo-American legal, political, and moral philosophy, it also aims to provide a normative theory of the foundations of the ECHR rights. The author argues that, unlike the role of human rights in theories of global justice, the purpose of the ECHR is not to set conditions for the legitimate tolerance of states at the international level; and unlike the role of human rights in the work of international human rights organisations, the purpose of the EC ... More
This book provides a philosophical study of the methods of interpretation used by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. By drawing on Anglo-American legal, political, and moral philosophy, it also aims to provide a normative theory of the foundations of the ECHR rights. The author argues that, unlike the role of human rights in theories of global justice, the purpose of the ECHR is not to set conditions for the legitimate tolerance of states at the international level; and unlike the role of human rights in the work of international human rights organisations, the purpose of the ECHR is not to set acceptable political goals that all states have a reason to pursue, albeit progressively and at their own discretion. Rather, the ECHR is best seen as enshrining human rights that are both legal and liberal: they are founded upon liberal egalitarian principles that impose conditions on the legitimate use of coercion by member states against persons within their jurisdiction. The normative role of the Convention rights is therefore no different to that of domestic constitutional rights within a liberal democracy. The book provides a critical account of the use of state consensus, evolutive interpretation, and the doctrine of the margin of appreciation in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. It defends the view that the ECHR rights, properly understood, are absolute rights which must be applied in a principled manner across the 47 European member states, regardless of drafters' intentions and states' current consensus.
Keywords:
philosophical foundations of human rights,
interpretation of human rights,
ECHR,
margin of appreciation,
consensus,
drafters' intentions,
deference,
judicial discretion,
legality,
autonomous concepts
Bibliographic Information
| Print publication date: 2007 |
Print ISBN-13: 9780199203437 |
| Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009 |
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199203437.001.0001 |