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Oxford Studies in MetaphysicsVolume 10$
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Karen Bennett and Dean W. Zimmerman

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198791973

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2017

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198791973.001.0001

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Vague Existence

Vague Existence

Chapter:
(p.201) 9 Vague Existence
Source:
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics
Author(s):

Alessandro Torza

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198791973.003.0009

Ted Sider has famously argued that existence, in the unrestricted sense of ontology, cannot be vague, as long as vagueness is modeled by means of precisifications. The first section of Chapter 9 exposes some controversial assumptions underlying Sider’s alleged reductio of vague existence. The upshot of the discussion is that, although existence cannot be vague, it can be super-vague, i.e. higher-order vague, for all orders. The second section develops and defends a novel framework, dubbed negative supervaluationary semantics, which makes room for the possibility of super-vague existence.

Keywords:   composition, mereology, negative free logic, ontology, quantification, supervaluationism

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