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Insiders versus OutsidersInterest Group Politics in Multilevel Europe$
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Andreas Dür and Gemma Mateo

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198785651

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198785651.001.0001

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Lobbying Insiders and Lobbying Outsiders

Lobbying Insiders and Lobbying Outsiders

2 Lobbying Insiders and Lobbying Outsiders
Insiders versus Outsiders

Andreas Dür

Gemma Mateo

Oxford University Press

Chapter 2 puts forward the theoretical framework that guides the book's analysis of lobbying in multilevel Europe. The key argument is that business and non-business groups differ in the severity of collective action problems and the resources they possess relatively abundantly. The expectation that follows from this argument is that different types of interest groups follow distinct logics of lobbying. Business groups, especially those that possess ample material resources, are more likely to follow an insider logic of lobbying, whereas non-business groups are more likely to pursue an outsider logic. The chapter briefly sets out a few expectations that derive from this argument for interest group strategies, access to decision-makers, and influence on policy outcomes.

Keywords:   Lobbying, interest groups, insiders, outsiders, business, non-business groups

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