Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Subject of Experience$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Galen Strawson

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198777885

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2017

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198777885.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 14 December 2018

‘The Self’

‘The Self’

(p.16) 2 ‘The Self’
The Subject of Experience

Galen Strawson

Oxford University Press

Many analytic philosophers have denied that the expression ‘the self’ refers to anything. Others have said its meaning is too unclear for it to be used in philosophy. Others have claimed that the only legitimate use of ‘I’ or ‘the self’ or ‘the subject of experience’ in the human case is to refer to the human being considered as a whole. This chapter aims to endow ‘the self’ (and ‘I’ and ‘subject of experience’) with sufficiently clear meaning, within a wholly materialist framework, without taking it to refer to the whole human being. It looks first at the phenomenology of self-experience, the experience of there being such a thing as the self, and see how the self is figured in self-experience. This provides materials with which to give the classical metaphysical questions (Do selves exist? What is their nature?) substantive and testable content.

Keywords:   I, self, self-experience, subject of experience, materialism, phenomenology

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .