Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Reality Making$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Mark Jago

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198755722

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755722.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 15 December 2018

Object as a Determinable

Object as a Determinable

Chapter:
(p.121) 6 Object as a Determinable
Source:
Reality Making
Author(s):

Nicholas K. Jones

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755722.003.0007

This chapter examines an intriguing and largely explored conception of objecthood, inspired by David Wiggins. On this view, the notion of an individual object is a determinable: there are many different and incompatible ways of being an object, by being one or another determinate kind of object. The view is used to expose the metaphysical and conceptual presuppositions of more familiar conceptions of objecthood, by showing how it undermines the Quinean dichotomy of ontology and ideology. It is then argued that the view allows us to systematise and unify some core components of a broadly Aristotelian metaphysic, including restrictions on de re possibility, as well as non-modal notions of essence and real definition. The focus is exclusively on explicating a conception of objecthood; positive arguments for it must await another occasion.

Keywords:   essence, real definition, objecthood, Fine, determinates and determinables, Wiggins, ontology, de re possibility

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .