Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Fixing Reference$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Imogen Dickie

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198755616

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755616.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 21 January 2018

The Mind Has a Basic Need to Represent Things Outside Itself

The Mind Has a Basic Need to Represent Things Outside Itself

Chapter:
(p.79) 3 The Mind Has a Basic Need to Represent Things Outside Itself
Source:
Fixing Reference
Author(s):

Imogen Dickie

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755616.003.0003

This chapter provides an account of what justifies our most basic presumptions of co-reference and identity judgements. The account is reached by extension from Anscombe’s notion of practical knowledge. Anscombian materials generate a notion of ‘justification’ for behaviour: a behaviour is justified iff it is guided by an intention of whose fulfilment it is a non-lucky generator. The chapter proposes that the justification for our most basic presumptions of co-reference and identity is also a kind of justification for behaviour, though in this case the guidance comes not from a conceptual motivational state (an intention) but from a non-conceptual one (a need): the mind has a basic need to represent things outside itself; the information marshalling involved in our most basic presumptions of co-reference and identity is justified because it is guided by this need, and is a reliable generator of the need’s fulfilment.

Keywords:   identity, co-reference, Anscombe, practical knowledge, intention, need, conceptual, non-conceptual, guidance

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .