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A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour$
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Keith Allen

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198755364

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755364.001.0001

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(p.131) 7 Revelation
A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour

Keith Allen

Oxford University Press

This chapter considers the relationship between naïve realist theories of colour and the epistemological thesis that Johnston calls ‘Revelation’: the thesis that the essential natures of the colours are revealed in visual experience. Although naïve realism and Revelation are often associated, this chapter argues that naïve realist theories of colour do not entail, and indeed are often inconsistent with, the epistemological thesis that the essential natures of the colours are revealed in colour experience. The naïve realist can accept that perceptual experiences acquaint us with the colours; but the naïve realist can and should insist that knowledge of their essential natures requires theoretical inquiry.

Keywords:   Revelation, naïve realism, visual experience, colour experience, perceptual experience, theoretical inquiry

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