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The Ethics of Human EnhancementUnderstanding the Debate$
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Steve Clarke, Julian Savulescu, Tony Coady, Alberto Giubilini, and Sagar Sanyal

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198754855

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198754855.001.0001

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Moral Enhancement, Enhancement, and Sentiment

Moral Enhancement, Enhancement, and Sentiment

Chapter:
(p.225) 16 Moral Enhancement, Enhancement, and Sentiment
Source:
The Ethics of Human Enhancement
Author(s):

Gregory E. Kaebnick

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198754855.003.0016

This chapter argues that the case for moral enhancement need not stand or fall depending on how one thinks about human enhancement in general. Indeed, one who is otherwise inclined to leave human nature as it is might nonetheless find moral enhancement attractive. Whether moral enhancement can be accepted even while enhancement generally is broadly resisted depends on how the argument for accepting human nature is crafted. In evaluating the case for moral enhancement, much depends on whether moral deliberation is understood as strictly an aspect of reason or, in a Humean vein, as intrinsically depending on sentiment or emotion. Seeing moral deliberation as involving the emotions, therefore as a matter of moral psychology, helps resolve the objection that moral enhancement would be at odds with freedom of the will. It also highlights the challenges, both technical and conceptual.

Keywords:   human enhancement, moral enhancement, sentimentalism, David Hume, freedom of the will, moral psychology

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